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Since the days ofNapster, peer to peer (P2P) file sharing has become 
ubiquitous and has ushered in an era of rampant digital piracy. 1 The most 
popular P2P file sharing protocol, BitTorrent, is the second-largest con-
sumer of bandwidth in North America, consuming 21.6 percent of all 
internet traffic over a twenty-four hour period. 2 It has been reported that 
BitTorrent has over 100 million monthly users from over 220 countries, 
surpassing the monthly usage of both Hulu and Netflix, estimated at 30 
million and 16.9 million monthly users respectively. 3 
Despite having various legal uses, P2P file sharing is commonly 
used to distribute copyrighted materials, movies, and music in particular, 
and is the basis of countless copyright infringement lawsuits. 4 Copyright 
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1 See Matthew Lasar, Sailors Beware: P2P Piracy Will Sink Your Jobs by 
2015, A.Rs TECHNICA (Mar. 22, 2010, 11:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/03/sailors-beware-p2p-piracy-will-sink-your-jobs-by-2015 .ars 
(identifying P2P file-sharing as primary avenue for piracy). 
2 See Geoff Gasior, Netflix Unseats BitTorrent as Internet Traffic King, THE 
TECH REPORT (May 18, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://techreport.com/discussions.x/20969 
(noting that BitTorrent is second only to Netflix in consumption of internet bandwidth 
over twenty-four hour periods, with Netflix ahead by only 0.6 percent). 
3 See Ernesto, UTorrent & BitTorrent Hit JOO Million Monthly Users, 
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 3, 2011 ), http://torrentfreak.com/utorrent-bittorrent-hit-100-
million-monthly-users-110103/ (announcing that BitTorrent' s two biggest clients, 
BitTorrent Mainline client and uTorrent, have combined number of users in excess of 
100 million); see also Austin Carr, BitTorrent Has More Users Than Netjlix and Hulu 
Combined- and Doubled (Jan. 4, 2011), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/1714001/bittorrent-swells-to-100-million-users (com-
paring number of monthly BitTorrent users to other popular internet media outlets). 
4 See Mark F. Schultz, Will BitTorrent Go the Way ofGrokster? File Shar-
ing After MGM v. Grokster, A.B.A. ScITECH LA WYER, Winter 2006, 4, 5 (reporting 
BitTorrent is used for distribution of copies of Linux, authorized file sharing of con-
cert recordings, and distribution of products by video game producers); see also Seth 
Schiesel, File Sharing's New Face: A More Efficient Swapping System Finds Uses 
Beyond Its Creator's Control, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004), at GI, available at 
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holders in the movie industry, attributing declining revenues at the box 
office and in DVD sales to digital piracy, have responded by filing suit 
against hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of defendants that alleg-
edly participated in P2P file-sharing of copyrighted materials. 5 As of 
August 2011, over 200,000 internet users across the United States have 
been targeted in mass file sharing lawsuits. 6 
In one of the largest file sharing lawsuits, Voltage Pictures, LLC. v. 
Does 1-5000, the copyright holders of the Academy Award winning 
film, "The Hurt Locker" sued 5000 "John Doe" defendants, identified 
only by their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, for illegally downloading 
and distributing the film using BitT orrent. 7 The copyright holders issued 
subpoenas to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) seeking the identifying 
information of the person behind each IP address. 8 In these mass file 
sharing lawsuits, once the copyright holders obtain the defendants' iden-
tifying information through discovery, the copyright holders typically 
offer the defendants settlements of two to three thousand dollars each. 9 
Defendan!s overwhelmingly choose to accept the settlement offers in 
lieu of proceeding to trial and facing legal fees and, potentially, penalties 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/technology/file-sharing-s-new-
face.html?src=pm (explaining motivation ofBitTorrent's creator, Bram Cohen, for 
creating BitTorrent file sharing protocol: downloading files rapidly by making better 
use of available bandwidth). 
5 See Kevin Parrish, 'Hurt Locker' Studio Now Suing Nearly 50K Pirates, 
ToM's GUIDE (May 24, 2011, 6:50 PM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/The-hurt-
Locker-V oltage-Pictures-Copyright-lnfringement-BitTorrent-USCG,news-
11307 .html (indicating that "Hurt Locker" earned merely seventeen million dollars 
from box office revenue); see also Jon Healey, File Sharing: To Fight or Accommo-
date?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/ opinion/la-oew-healey 1aprO1,0,20144 71. story (de-
scribing how DVD sales have leveled off after years of growth). 
6 See Ernesto, 200,000 BitTorrent Users Sued in the United States, 
TORRENT FREAK (Aug. 8, 2011 ), http://torrentfreak.com/200000-bittorrent-users-sued-
in-the-united-states-110808/ (declaring that over 200,000 BitTorrent John Does have 
been sued since 2010). 
7 See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011 
WL 1807438, at *1 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (providing background information about 
Voltage's file sharing lawsuit against anonymous users). 
8 See Greg Sandoval, 'Hurt Locker' Downloaders, You've Been Sued, 
CNETNEWS (May 28, 2010, 12:19 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-
20006314-261.html (noting that due to large requests for identifying information, 
ISP's have complained that they do not have resources to track down so many de-
fendants). 
9 See Julianne Pepitone, 50,000 BitTorrent Users Sued for Alleged Illegal 
Downloads, CNN MONEY (June 10, 2011, 3:59 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/1 O/technology/bittorrent_lawsuits/index.htm (offering 
defendants settlements of $1500 to $2500 to avoid litigation). 
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up to the statutory limit of$150,000. 10 The risk of extraordinary damag-
es being rendered against a defendant file-sharer is supported by P2P file 
sharing case law, and in one case a verdict of $675,000, later remitted to 
$67,500, was rendered against a P2P file-sharer. 11 
Critics have referred to the mass lawsuits as judicially sponsored 
"extortion," noting the copyright holders' strategy of coercing defend-
ants to pay small settlements rather than risk facing relatively larger pen-
alties at trial. 12 Other commentators have derisively referred to the file 
sharing lawsuits as "fishing expedition[ s ]" because copyright holders 
seek to discover identifying information of defendants to facilitate set-
tlements based on limited evidence of defendants' engagement in in-
fringing activity, namely the defendants' IP addresses. 13 
The mass P2P file sharing lawsuits raise procedural questions for the 
district courts overseeing these cases, notably, whether to allow joinder 
of all defendants in one suit and whether the defense of lack of personal 
jurisdiction should be assessed before or after defendants are named in 
the suit. 14 With no guidance from appellate courts squarely addressing 
10 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2005) (limiting statutory damages to 
$150,000 per infringed work, where plaintiff sustains burden of proving that defend-
ants willfully infringed copyright). See Pepitone, supra note 9 (collecting views of 
critics who say Voltage's suit is exploitative of copyright law, and referring to litiga-
tion as employing "pay up or we'll getcha" method). 
11 See Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (remitting damages awarded by jury to $2250 per infringed work, or 
three times the statutory minimum, since original damage award was grossly exces-
sive in violation of Due Process), rev'd, Nos. 10-1883, 10-1947, 10-2052, 2011 WL 
4133920 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 2011): 
12 See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, 'Hurt Locker' Lawsuit Targets 24,583 Bit-
Torrent Users, PC WORLD (May 24, 2011, 8:07 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/228519/hurt_locker_lawsuit_targets_24583_bittorren 
t_ users.html (criticizing the US Copyright Group for engaging in extortion because 
they have no intention of suing users and simply wish to collect settlements); see also 
Emil Protalinski, Torrent Users Sue US Copyright Group for Fraud and Extortion, 
TECHSPOT (Nov. 29, 2010, 3:21 PM), http://www.techspot.com/news/41341-torrent-
users-sue-us-copyright-group-for-fraud-and-extortion.html (describing torrent users' 
lawsuit, alleging fraud and extortion, against a law firm that represented USCG in 
file-sharing lawsuit). 
13 See Nate Anderson, Judge: P2P Class-Action Suit Looks Like a "Fishing 
Expedition," A.Rs TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2011, 11 :43 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011 /03/judge-p2p-class-action-suit-looks-like-a-fishing-expedition.ars 
(quoting judge who referred to mass file- sharing lawsuits as "fishing expedition[s]"); 
see also Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses Aren't Enough 
to Find File-Swappers, A.Rs TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011, 12:37 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-find-
file-swappers.ars (explaining that IP addresses do not provide specific evidence of 
who committed infringement). 
14 For a further discussion of procedural challenges raised by defendants in 
P2P file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 89-116 and accompanying text. 
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the procedural issues raised by John Doe P2P lawsuits, courts have re-
sponded to these questions in largely dissimilar ways; the differences 
significantly affect the defendants' privacy rights as well as copyright 
holders' ability to protect their copyrights. 15 
Part I will discuss BitTorrent's P2P architecture, how it works, and 
its ramifications regarding copyright infringement. 16 Part II details the 
different ways in which copyright holders can obtain identifying infor-
mation of anonymous users of P2P networks suspected of engaging in 
infringing activity. 17 Part ill examines how courts have resolved the pro-
cedural issues raised by the John Doe defendants, such as whether join-
der is proper, whether there is personal jurisdiction, and whether these 
issues should be addressed before or after the identification of the Doe 
defendants. 18 District courts disagree on whether hundreds or even thou-
sands of John Does can be joined in a single suit. 19 To a lesser extent, 
courts disagree on when and how to address personal jurisdiction in 
these cases. 20 Part IV will present an argument for how courts should 
resolve the procedural issues raised by these cases. 21 Finally, Part V will 
place the mass file sharing lawsuits in context for future analysis of how 
courts should address copyright infringement via P2P networks.22 
I. PIRACYVIAP2PNETWORKS 
The development ofN apster marked the beginning of the age of P2P 
file sharing. 23 A P2P network is one in which a user can distribute files 
15 For a further discussion of the various approaches district courts have 
taken to assessing procedural issues in John Doe file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 
89-167 and accompanying text. 
16 For a further discussion of P2P networks, see infra notes 23-51 and ac-
companying text. 
17 For a further discussion of how copyright holders identify anonymous 
users engaging in infringing activity, see infra notes 52-88 and accompanying text. 
18 For a further discussion of copyright infringement suits against John Does 
who downloaded copyrighted films using P2P networks, and the attendant procedural 
issues, see infra notes 89-167 and accompanying text. 
19 For a further discussion of the propriety of joinder of John Doe defendants, 
see infra notes 140-167 and accompanying text. 
2° For a .further discussion of defenses raised by John Does regarding person-
al jurisdiction, see infra notes 117-13 9 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 168-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
text. 
22 See infra notes 223-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
text. 
23 See In re Charter Commc'ns, 393 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2005) (''Napster 
was the first and most notorious P2P system."); see also Joshua M. Dickman, Ano-
nymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. 
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directly from his computer to another user, or peer. 24 P2P file sharing 
differs from traditional file sharing protocols that are based on client-
server architecture in which a central computer, called a server, sends 
data out to individual users or clients. 25 Client-server file transfer proto-
col suffers the limitation of slowing download speed to clients as more 
clients request information from the central server; this drawback served 
as an incentive to develop alternative file sharing protocol. 26 
Napster, employing P2P architecture, diverged from traditional cli-
ent-server architectures in that Napster users would not request a file 
from a central server, but would simply ~equest a file from another us-
er. 27 Despite employing P2P architecture, the parent corporation ofNap-
ster still maintained a centralized server to store copies of the files users 
requested, making the parent corporation an easy target for copyright 
holders' infringement suits. 28 For this reason, the central server proved to 
be N apster' s Achilles heel, subjecting the parent corporation to vicarious 
and contributory infringement and ultimately leading to the demise of 
N apster as a company and as a piracy hub. 29 
After Napster's downfall, new P2P file sharing networks began to 
develop that avoided Napster' s flaw of relying on centralized servers. 30 
Decentralized networks, such as Grokster andBitTorrent, allow individ-
ual users to send information directly to one another without using a 
L. REv. 1049, 1055 (2008) (recognizing that music downloading dramatically in-
creased upon Napster's inception). 
24 See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 276 F.R.D. 
241, 244 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (contrasting P2P network architecture with client-server 
architecture in which any given user communicates with one central computer server 
containing all files or information). 
25 See id. (detailing how BitTorrent works). 
26 See id. (explaining that, in client-server architecture, reliable access to data 
is dependent upon a server's ability to operate continuously under high volumes of 
simultaneous requests from clients). 
27 See In re Charter Commc'ns, 393 F.3d at 773 (distinguishing Napster's 
architecture from client-server architecture). 
28 See id. (maintaining central server with copies of files distributed by 
peers); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2001) (describing how parent corporation's publishing of available files facilitated 
infringement by the program's users). 
29 See A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1024 (holding Napster contributorily 
and vicariously liable for copyright infringement due to its failure to police its prem-
ises and its central server, and for deriving financial benefit). 
30 See Vincent J. Galluzzo, When "Now Known or Later Developed" Fails 
its Purpose: How P2P Litigation Has Turned the Distribution Right Upside-Down, 61 
FLA. L. REv. 1165, 1175 (2009) (observing that software developers designed new 
P2P architecture that did not require centralized servers, facilitating avoidance of 
contributory and vicarious liability). 
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central server to store and transmit data to or from users. 31 Instead, Bit-
Torrent uses its servers as "trackers," to store lists describing "swarms," 
which are groups of individual users involved in downloading and dis-
tributing particular files. 32 Swarms can last for several days or even sev-
eral weeks depending on the popularity of the file being shared. 33 
For a BitTorrent user to engage in file sharing, a peer connects to a 
tracker to find a swarm to download a particular file. 34 Once a user lo-
cates a swarm, the user downloads small pieces of the file from several 
other users, rather than downloading the file in its entirety from a single 
user or a central server.35 In this way, BitTorrent makes efficient use of 
bandwidth and allows users to download files at higher speeds as the 
number of peers in the swarm increases. 36 Lastly, once a user downloads 
a particular file, the user automatically becomes a source for future users 
to download the same file. 37 As a result, BitT orrent file sharing protocol 
makes it impossible for any user to receive files without also sharing 
files. 38 
BitT orrent' s decentralized nature insulates it from traditional antipi-
racy measures. 39 Actions to enjoin the central server from unlawfully 
31 See Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 
2011WL3100404, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (allowing individual users to 
exchange data with one another anonymously). 
32 See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011 WL 
3498227, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (describing the use of a tracker to help peers 
locate one another and noting that trackers do not participate directly in data transfer 
and do not store copies of any files). 
33 See Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-2590, No. C 11-2766 MEJ, 2011 WL 
4407172, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011) (indicating that the size of any swarm var-
ies over time and can last more than twelve months depending on the popularity of 
the motion picture distributed). 
34 See First Time Videos, 2011WL3498227, at *1 (using trackers to locate 
other peers that are distributing particular files). 
35 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (explaining that BitTorrent lets users 
exchange data between themselves by exchanging file pieces with one another until 
the entire file is transferred). 
36 See Patrick Collins, 2011WL4407172, at *5 (increasing speed at which 
peers download shared files as total number of peers in swarm increases). 
37 See id. (explaining that as each peer receives file pieces, that peer simulta-
neously distributes those pieces to other peers). 
38 See Hard Drive, 2011 WL 3740473, at *1 (examining how BitTorrent 
users simultaneously receive and transfer information to other peers). 
39 See id. at *2 (reasoning that BitTorrent's decentralized architecture makes 
it less vulnerable to copyright infringement claims); see also Diabolic Video Prods., 
Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011WL3100404, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
May 31, 2011) ("Because there are no central servers to enjoin from unlawfully dis-
tributing copyrighted content, there is no primary target on which to focus anti-piracy 
efforts."). 
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distributing copyrighted content, as in Napster, are inapplicable to de-
centralized P2P networks since no central server is used to store copy-
righted material: file transfers occur directly between users. 40 The Ninth 
Circuit reached this conclusion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster Ltd., where it held that Grokster was not liable for vicarious or 
contributory infringement since it did not store copyright infringing ma-
terial on its servers.41 The Supreme Court reversed the Grokster deci-
sion, but on the basis that Grokster induced users to engage in copyright 
infringement. 42 Therefore, the parent corporations of decentralized P2P 
networks can avoid liability if they do not facilitate copyright infringe-
ment by inducing or encouraging users to engage in such activity. 43 As a 
result, copyright holders are unlikely to recover from the parent corpora-
tions of these passive P2P networks, and must instead bring suit against 
P2P file-sharers individually. 44 
Notwithstanding the anonymity provided by decentralized P2P file-
sharing networks, copyright holders can still manage to identify and find 
defendants who engage in file sharing of copyrighted material because 
users transmit their Internet Protocol (IP) address before they can dis-
tribute or receive files using BitTorrent. 45 Each user's IP address is asso-
ciated with their Internet Service Provider (ISP), which assigns each of 
its subscribers a unique IP address. 46 ISPs maintain records of the identi-
fying information of their subscribers along with each subscriber's as-
40 See Hard Drive, 2011WL3740473, at *2 (indicating that BitTorrent's 
central servers do not facilitate file transfers between peers); see also Vickie L. Fee-
man, William S. Coats, Heather D. Rafter & John G. Given, Revenge of the Record 
Industry Association of America: The Rise and Fall ofNapster, 9 VILL. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 35, 55 (2002) (suggesting that the generation of file sharing networks after 
Napster are harder to police and do not maintain lists of available content on a central 
server). 
41 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 
1157 (9th Cir. 2004) (ruling that Grokster could not be held liable for vicarious and 
contributory infringement merely because it distributed software that was used for 
infringing activity). 
42 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
916 (2005) (concluding that Grokster was almost exclusively used for copyright in-
fringement and that Grokster encouraged users to engage in infringing activity by 
holding itself out as Napster's replacement). 
43 See id. (holding Grokster liable for inducing infringement rather than for 
storing copyright infringing material on its central servers as in Napster). 
44 See Galluzzo, supra note 30, at 1176 (discussing difficulty in enforcing 
copyrights when users share files on decentralized networks with no central server). 
45 See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011 WL 
3498227, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (identifying BitTorrent users by their IP ad-
dresses, which are defined by the court as "identification numbers assigned to every 
device connected to the internet"). 
46 See id. (noting that IP addresses are unique). 
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infringement. 42 Therefore, the parent corporations of decentralized P2P 
networks can avoid liability if they do not facilitate copyright infringe-
ment by inducing or encouraging users to engage in such activity. 43 As a 
result, copyright holders are unlikely to recover from the parent corpora-
tions of these passive P2P networks, and must instead bring suit against 
P2P file-sharers individually. 44 
Notwithstanding the anonymity provided by decentralized P2P file-
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signed IP address. 47 To obtainBitTorrentusers' IP addresses, some cop-
yright holders contract with anti-piracy firms, such as Guardaley Lim-
ited, which use proprietary technology to track and log the IP addresses 
ofBitTorrent users who distribute copyright holders' movies.48 
Despite the common use of IP addresses to identify infringers, this 
method is problematic given that IP addresses often do not correspond 
with a particular person. 49 For example, some landlords provide internet 
access for multiple tenants, children may use a relative' s internet connec-
tion while visiting, and others may simply gain access to a neighbor's 
unsecure wireless network. 50 The uncertainty in using IP addresses to 
identify a particular person causes difficulty in determining who should 
properly be named as a defendant. 51 
II. UNMASKING ANONYMOUS FILE-SHARERS 
The success of mass file sharing lawsuits depends in part upon copy-
right holders' ability to obtain the identifying information of putative 
defendants who, at the time of filing suit, are known only by IP ad-
dress. 52 To compel ISPs to provide identifying information, copyright 
holders first turned to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
which includes a subpoena provision specifically allowing copyright 
holders to subpoena ISPs to divulge the identifying information of users 
linked to suspect IP addresses. 53 However, courts have interpreted the 
DMCA subpoena provision narrowly, denying subpoenas issued to ISP's 
acting as "conduits" in file sharing between users. 54 Without this rela-
47 See id. (explaining that ISPs keep records of IP addresses assigned to each 
of its subscribers). 
48 See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 
339 (D.D.C. 2011) (detailing how copyright holders hire anti-piracy firms to monitor 
BitTorrent swarms in order to identify infringing users by their IP address, date, and 
time of distributing copyright material). 
49 See Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses Aren't 
Enough to Find File-Swappers, ARs TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-find-
file-swappers.ars (suggesting that IP addresses are not accurate pieces of identifying 
information). 
50 See id. (providing examples of situations where IP addresses do not serve 
to identify any particular person). 
51 See id. (highlighting uncertainty in naming defendants to lawsuits using 
only IP addresses). 
52 See, e.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (moving for ex-
pedited discovery to subpoena ISPs to obtain the defendants' identifying information 
in order to name them in the suit). 
53 See infra notes 59-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
text. 
54 See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
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tively convenient remedy, copyright holders can unmask "John Does" 
only by filing suit against unnamed defendants and subsequently issuing 
civil subpoenas to ISPs. 55 Revealing the identity of anonymous users is 
not without issue; in fact, several courts have held that John Does' file-
sharing activity should be afforded some degree of First Amendment 
. 56 protect10n. 
A. Paper Tiger: The DMCA § 512(h) Subpoena 
In an attempt to modernize copyright law to account for changes in 
an increasingly digital world, Congress enacted the DMCA with the in-
tention that it serve two primary, yet somewhat conflicting purposes. 57 
First, the DMCA is designed to protect the rights of copyright holders, 
and second, it serves to limit ISPs' liability for the infringing activity of 
their subscribers by granting ISPs "safe harbors in certain delineated 
circumstances."58 In contrast to the safe harbor provisions, which serve 
to benefit ISPs, copyright holders benefit from the DMCA' s requirement 
that ISPs remove infringing content, commonly referred to as "notice 
and take down" provisions, and by 17 U.S.C § 512(h), which allows 
copyright holders to subpoena ISPs to produce identifying information 
for subscribers suspected of engaging in infringing activity. 59 The 
§512(h) subpoena provided copyright holders with a convenient means 
of obtaining the identifying information of anonymous users engaged in 
illegal distribution of copyrighted materials. 60 Section 512(h) outlines the 
minimal requirements necessary for a copyright holder to issue subpoe-
55 See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. 
56 See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
57 See Alice Kao, Note, R.IAA v. Verizon: Applying the Subpoena Provision 
of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 409 (2004) (describing the two purposes 
that Congress intended the DMCA to serve). 
58 Id. (noting Congress's first purpose for enacting the DMCA); 17 U.S.C. § 
512(a)-(d) (2006) (shielding ISPs from liability for copyright infringement when the 
ISPs engage in activities such as transmitting, system caching, storing information at 
direction of user, or providing links to copyrighted, or otherwise protected materials). 
59 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (granting a copyright holder, or a person 
authorized to act on his behalf, the ability to issue a subpoena to an ISP in order to 
obtain identifying information for infringing subscribers even where no lawsuit is 
pending). 
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A)-(C) (allowing copyright holder to issue 
request for subpoena to any clerk of United States where request must include: copy 
of notification, proposed subpoena, and sworn declaration that information sought is 
for purpose of protecting copyright). See Kao, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 410 (outlining section 512(h)'s minimal requirements for obtaining sub-
poenas and indicating compulsory disclosure of identifying information by ISPs). 
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dress. 52 To compel ISPs to provide identifying information, copyright 
holders first turned to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
which includes a subpoena provision specifically allowing copyright 
holders to subpoena ISPs to divulge the identifying information of users 
linked to suspect IP addresses. 53 However, courts have interpreted the 
DMCA subpoena provision narrowly, denying subpoenas issued to ISP's 
acting as "conduits" in file sharing between users. 54 Without this rela-
47 See id. (explaining that ISPs keep records of IP addresses assigned to each 
of its subscribers). 
48 See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 
339 (D.D.C. 2011) (detailing how copyright holders hire anti-piracy firms to monitor 
BitTorrent swarms in order to identify infringing users by their IP address, date, and 
time of distributing copyright material). 
49 See Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses Aren't 
Enough to Find File-Swappers, ARs TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011 /08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-find-
file-swappers.ars (suggesting that IP addresses are not accurate pieces of identifying 
information). 
50 See id. (providing examples of situations where IP addresses do not serve 
to identify any particular person). 
51 See id. (highlighting uncertainty in naming defendants to lawsuits using 
only IP addresses). 
52 See, e.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (moving for ex-
pedited discovery to subpoena ISPs to obtain the defendants' identifying information 
in order to name them in the suit). 
53 See infra notes 59-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
text. 
54 See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
MASS FILE SHARING LAWSUITS 339 
tively convenient remedy, copyright holders can unmask "John Does" 
only by filing suit against unnamed defendants and subsequently issuing 
civil subpoenas to ISPs. 55 Revealing the identity of anonymous users is 
not without issue; in fact, several courts have held that John Does' file-
sharing activity should be afforded some degree of First Amendment 
. 56 protect10n. 
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First, the DMCA is designed to protect the rights of copyright holders, 
and second, it serves to limit ISPs' liability for the infringing activity of 
their subscribers by granting ISPs "safe harbors in certain delineated 
circumstances."58 In contrast to the safe harbor provisions, which serve 
to benefit ISPs, copyright holders benefit from the DMCA' s requirement 
that ISPs remove infringing content, commonly referred to as "notice 
and take down" provisions, and by 17 U.S.C § 512(h), which allows 
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512(a)-(d) (2006) (shielding ISPs from liability for copyright infringement when the 
ISPs engage in activities such as transmitting, system caching, storing information at 
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request for subpoena to any clerk of United States where request must include: copy 
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for purpose of protecting copyright). See Kao, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
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nas and obtain identifying information of a suspected infringing party 
from an ISP. 61 
Despite Congress's good intentions in developing the DMCA sub-
poena provisions, Congress drafted the DMCA prior to the rise of P2P 
networks. 62 As a result, courts have refused to grant subpoenas pursuant 
to § 512(h) where the infringing activity took place on BitTorrent or 
other P2P networks. 63 
In Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon Inter-
net Services, Inc., the D.C. Circuit became the first court to consider the 
issue and it determined that § 512(h) did not apply when an ISP acts 
simply as a conduit for transmission of information sent by others. 64 The 
court stated that "[i]t is not the province of the courts ... to rewrite the 
DMCA in order to make it fit a new and unforeseen internet architecture, 
no matter how damaging that development has been."65 The court predi-
cated this finding on its assumption that: 
Had the Congress been aware of P2P technology, or anticipated 
its development, § 512(h) might have been drafted more gener-
ally. Be that as it may ... nothing in the legislative history 
supports the issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena to an ISP acting 
as a conduit for P2P file-sharing. 66 
61 See Kristina Groennings, Note, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Indus-
try's Litigation Ag~inst Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 574 (noting that 
previously, to obtain a§ 512(h) subpoena, the RIAA only needed to supply a small 
fee and, "a copy of notification, the proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration 
indicating that the information sought was for the sole purpose of protecting copy-
right."); see also Colin E. Shanahan, Comment, ACTA Fool or: How Rights Holders 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 512 's Subpoena Provisions, 15 MARQ. lNTELL. 
PROP. L. REv. 465, 470 (2011) (listing the steps a rights holder is required to follow in 
order to obtain a§ 512(h) subpoena). 
62 See Kao, supra note 57, at 409 (noting that "the DMCA was enacted in 
1998, before the explosive rise in P2P popularity''). 
63 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 
F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that a subpoena may only be served on 
an ISP that is storing infringing materials on its servers, and that a subpoena may not 
be served on an ISP that merely serves as the means through which files are shared on 
P2P networks); see also Interscope Records v. Does 1-7, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391 
· (E.D. Va. 2007) (refusing to authorize§ 512(h) subpoenas that were served on colleg-
es for the purpose of discovering the identity of students who were engaged in in-
fringing activity). 
64 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 351 F.3d at 1238 (explaining that 
"Congress had no reason to foresee the application of§ 512(h) to P2P file sharing."). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit and several lower courts have held that 
when the ISP acts as a "conduit" between two users, as in the case of 
P2P networks, a§ 512(h) subpoena cannot be issued to an ISP. 67 
B. Fighting the Army of Pirates: John Doe Lawsuits 
Although the DMCA intended to provide copyright holders with a 
subpoena to obtain identifying information for infringing parties, courts 
have held that its provisions do not extend to P2P networks. 68 Copyright 
holders, however, have an alternative means of obtaining an infringer's 
identifying information: instead of issuing a subpoena under the DMCA, 
the copyright holders can file "John Doe" lawsuits. 69 
Under the "John Doe" litigation strategy, copyright holders may file 
lawsuits against unnamed putative defendants identified only by their IP 
addresses. 70 The copyright holders could then move for expedited dis-
covery and issue civil subpoenas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 45 71 to ISPs requesting the identifying information of each de-
fendant based on their IP addresses. 72 John Doe lawsuits tend to be cost-
ly for copyright holders, but they are the only means available to identify 
and recover from infringers using modem P2P networks. 73 Further, John 
Doe lawsuits raise novel procedural questions, including: whether ISP 
defendants can raise objections to personal jurisdiction prior to naming 
"John Doe" defendants in suit, whether courts should grant copyright 
67 See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(agreeing with defendant ISP's argument that a§ 512(h) subpoena served on the ISP 
was improper because the ISP functioned as a conduit to transfer data between two 
users on a P2P network); see also In re Subpoena to Univ. ofN.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 
F. Supp. 2d 945, 956 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (rejecting the RIAA's request to extend§ 
512(h) subpoena provisions to ISPs serving as conduits for data transfers between two 
internet users). 
68 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.· 
69 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26( d)(l) (allowing parties to seek discovery prior to 
holding a Rule 26(f) conference, pursuant to a court order). 
70 See Shanahan, supra note 61, at 473 (describing the process by which 
copyright holders may file John Doe lawsuits against unnamed defendants who are 
suspected of engaging in copyright infringement through the use of P2P file sharing 
networks). 
71 See FED. R. Crv. P. 45(A) (setting forth the requirements for obtaining a 
civil subpoena). 
72 See Shanahan, supra note 61, at 473 (explaining how rights-holders use 
civil subpoenas to "compel the ISP associated with each IP address to divulge the 
names and addresses associated with those IP addresses."). 
73 Id. (indicating that John Doe lawsuits are a copyright holder's only re-
course for identifying and holding accountable copyright infringers); see also Dick-
man, supra note 23, at 1053 (noting that the typical music downloading copyright 
infringement suit is a John Doe lawsuit brought by a recording company). 
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court stated that "[i]t is not the province of the courts ... to rewrite the 
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no matter how damaging that development has been. "65 The court predi-
cated this finding on its assumption that: 
Had the Congress been aware of P2P technology, or anticipated 
its development, § 512(h) might have been drafted more gener-
ally. Be that as it may . . . nothing in the legislative history 
supports the issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena to an ISP acting 
as a conduit for P2P file-sharing. 66 
61 See Kristina Groennings, Note, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Indus-
try's Litigation AgCI_inst Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 574 (noting that 
previously, to obtain a § 512(h) subpoena, the RIAA only needed to supply a small 
fee and, "a copy of notification, the proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration 
indicating that the information sought was for the sole purpose of protecting copy-
right."); see also Colin E. Shanahan, Comment, ACTA Fool or: How Rights Holders 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 512 's Subpoena Provisions, 15 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 465, 470 (2011) (listing the steps a rights holder is required to follow in 
order to obtain a§ 512(h) subpoena). 
62 See Kao, supra note 57, at 409 (noting that "the DMCA was enacted in 
1998, before the explosive rise in P2P popularity''). 
63 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 
F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that a subpoena may only be served on 
an ISP that is storing infringing materials on its servers, and that a subpoena may not 
be served on an ISP that merely serves as the means through which files are shared on 
P2P networks); see also Interscope Records v. Does 1-7, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391 
· (E.D. Va. 2007) (refusing to authorize§ 512(h) subpoenas that were served on colleg-
es for the purpose of discovering the identity of students who were engaged in in-
fringing activity). 
64 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 351 F.3d at 1238 (explaining that 
"Congress had no reason to foresee the application of§ 512(h) to P2P file sharing."). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit and several lower courts have held that 
when the ISP acts as a "conduit" between two users, as in the case of 
P2P networks, a§ 512(h) subpoena cannot be issued to an ISP. 67 
B. Fighting the Army of Pirates: John Doe Lawsuits 
Although the DMCA intended to provide copyright holders with a 
subpoena to obtain identifying information for infringing parties, courts 
have held that its provisions do not extend to P2P networks. 68 Copyright 
holders, however, have an alternative means of obtaining an infringer's 
identifying information: instead of issuing a subpoena under the DMCA, 
the copyright holders can file "John Doe" lawsuits. 69 
Under the "John Doe" litigation strategy, copyright holders may file 
lawsuits against unnamed putative defendants identified only by their IP 
addresses. 70 The copyright holders could then move for expedited dis-
covery and issue civil subpoenas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 45 71 to ISPs requesting the identifying information of each de-
fendant based on their IP addresses. 72 John Doe lawsuits tend to be cost-
ly for copyright holders, but they are the only means available to identify 
and recover from infringers using modem P2P networks. 73 Further, John 
Doe lawsuits raise novel procedural questions, including: whether ISP 
defendants can raise objections to personal jurisdiction prior to naming 
"John Doe" defendants in suit, whether courts should grant copyright 
67 See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(agreeing with defendant ISP's argument that a§ 512(h) subpoena served on the ISP 
was improper because the ISP functioned as a conduit to transfer data between two 
users on a P2P network); see also In re Subpoena to Univ. ofN.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 
F. Supp. 2d 945, 956 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (rejecting the RIAA's request to extend§ 
512(h) subpoena provisions to ISPs serving as conduits for data transfers between two 
internet users). 
68 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.· 
69 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d)(l) (allowing parties to seek discovery prior to 
holding a Rule 26(f) conference, pursuant to a court order). 
70 See Shanahan, supra note 61, at 473 (describing the process by which 
copyright holders may file John Doe lawsuits against unnamed defendants who are 
suspected of engaging in copyright infringement through the use of P2P file sharing 
networks). 
71 See FED. R. Crv. P. 45(A) (setting forth the requirements for obtaining a 
civil subpoena). 
72 See Shanahan, supra note 61, at 473 (explaining how rights-holders use 
civil subpoenas to "compel the ISP associated with each IP address to divulge the 
names and addresses associated with those IP addresses."). 
73 Id. (indicating that John Doe lawsuits are a copyright holder's only re-
course for identifying and holding accountable copyright infringers); see also Dick-
man, supra note 23, at 1053 (noting that the typical music downloading copyright 
infringement suit is a John Doe lawsuit brought by a recording company). 
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holders expedited discovery to identify John Does; and, whether j oinder 
of all defendants is proper. 74 
Another concern raised in John Doe lawsuits stems from judicial 
recognition that the First Amendment's protections are implicated by 
civil subpoenas that seek disclosure of anonymous users' identifying 
information. 75 Some courts have concluded that file sharing via P2P 
networks qualifies as free speech under the First Amendment and should 
be afforded some degree ofprotection.76 Nevertheless, courts have gen-
erally agreed that "First Amendment privacy interests are exceedingly 
small where the 'speech' is the alleged infringement of copyrights."77 
Accordingly, the court in Sony Music Entertainment Inc., v. Does 1-40, 
held that because file-sharers are not seeking to communicate a thought 
or idea, and are simply attempting to obtain free music, such speech 
should be afforded only limited First Amendment protection. 78 
When considering whether the First Amendment's protections ex-
tend to a file-sharer's right to engage in anonymous speech, the court in 
Sonyconsidered five factors that various courts have used to determine 
whether a defendant's identity should be protected from disclosure. 79 
The five factors the court considered in Sony were: 1) a concrete show-
ing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm; 2) the specificity of the 
discovery request; 3) an absence of alternative means to obtain subpoe-
naed information; 4) a central need for the subpoenaed information to 
74 See infra notes 87-112 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
procedural issues involved in mass file sharing lawsuits. 
75 See Call of the Wild Movie LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 349 
(D.D.C. 2011) (recognizing that file-sharing involves expressive communication); see 
also First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011WL3498227, at *6 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (indicating that file-sharers First Amendment protections are 
limited); see also Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289(RWS), 2004 
WL 2095581, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 8, 2004); see also Sony Music Entm'tv. Does 1-40, 
326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (holding that while downloading, distributing, 
and making available copyrighted sound recordings is entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, such protection is very limited.) 
76 See Sony, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (arguing that "a file sharer is making a 
statement by downloading and making available to others copyrighted music without 
charge and without license to do so ... [and] may be expressing himself or herself 
through the music selected and made available to others."). 
77 See Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(listing cases that hold that First Amendment protections are small when the speech 
involves copyright infringement). 
78 See Sony, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (finding that file-sharers are entitled to 
"some level of First Amendment protection."). 
79 See id. (concluding that use of P2P networks to download and distribute 
music entitles a user to a limited degree of First Amendment protection that must be 
weighed against plaintiff's need for disclosure of identifying information). 
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advance the claim; and, 5) the party's expectation of privacy. 80 Ultimate-
ly, the court in Sony found that each factor supported the disclosure of 
the defendants' identifying information and that the defendants' First 
Amendment right to remain anonymous gave way to the plaintiffs' right 
to pursue its copyright infringement claims. 81 The factors used in Sony 
establish a low threshold for obtainillg a civil subpoena and courts apply-
ing the Sony test typically grant plaintiffs' requests for subpoenas. 82 
Moreover, several courts have applied Sony's five-factor test in consider-
ing whether to allow subpoenas in the context of P2P file sharing. 83 
Courts that reject the conclusion that file sharing is entitled to some 
level of First Amendment protection have applied, in the alternative to 
the Sony test, a "good cause" test. 84 The good cause test provides no spe-
cial protections for anonymous speech. 85 The good cause test is satisfied 
when there are allegations of copyright infringement and expedited dis-
covery would contribute to the case moving forward. 86 In general, when 
the speech in question involves copyright infringement, courts tend to 
apply a low burden test such as the Sony test or the good cause test. 87 
Under either of these tests, subpoenas that reveal the identifying infor-
mation of anonymous P2P file-sharers are typically granted. 88 
80 See id. at 564-65 (describing the factors used for determining whether to 
grant a subpoena to a copyright holder). 
81 See id. at 567 (holding that "defendants' First Amendment right to remain 
anonymous must give way to plaintiffs' right to ... pursue what appear to be merito-
rious copyright infringement claims."). 
82 See Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane and John: 
Can the Media Protect Anonymous Online Speech? 26-COMMC 'NS LA WYER 4, 6-7 
(2009) (discussing the plaintiff's low burden on plaintiff for satisfying the Sony re-
quirements for obtaining a subpoena). 
83 See Interscope Records v. Does 1-14, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179-80 (D. 
Kan. 2008) (using Sony's five factor analysis, and finding the factors weighed in 
favor of compelling disclosure of the identifying information); see also Elektra 
Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289(RWS), 2004 WL 2095581, at *4-5 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004) (applying Sony's five-factor analysis and finding each factor 
favored disclosure). 
84 See Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 87, at 7 (explaining that the "good 
cause" test "provides no special protection for anonymous speech"). 
85 See id. ("The good cause test is the weakest standard created by the 
courts."). 
86 See id. (summarizing the minimal showing required to establish good 
cause). 
87 See id. at 5 (indicating that the type of speech is a primary issue in deter-
mining the degree of burden to apply to plaintiff's subpoena request). 
88 See Interscope, 558 F. Supp. at 1179-81 (applying the Sony test and deny-
ing the motion to quash the subpoena); see also Elektra, 2004 WL 2095581, at *4-5 
(applying the Sony test and denying the motion to quash the subpoena); see also Sony 
Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying 
defendant's motion to quash the subpoena); see also LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-
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III. MIXED SYMP ATIDES FOR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS 
Although John Doe suits may be copyright holders' last line of de-
fense against direct infringers, these mass lawsuits have encountered 
judges that seem unsympathetic to the copyright holders' plight. 89 Judges 
presiding over mass file sharing cases have reached largely dissimilar 
conclusions on threshold procedural issues. 9° For example, two of the 
largest mass suits against P2P file-sharers were both brought in the dis-
trict court for the District of Columbia and resulted in entirely disparate 
outcomes. 91 In Voltage Pictures, Judge Howell allowed the plaintiff to 
take leave for expedited discovery and denied all of the defendants' mo-
tions to protect their identifying information. 92 On the other hand, Judge 
Wilkins in Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 23,322 rejected the plaintiff's motion 
for expedited discovery, and shortly thereafter the plaintiff dropped the 
entire suit against all defendants. 93 
Other courts have employed various approaches to limit and control 
the mass file sharing cases and have taken issue with different aspects of 
the suits. 94 InAchte/Nuente Boll Kina Beteilingungs GMBh & Co. KG v. 
Does 1-4,577, Judge Collyer rejected the copyright holders' request fora 
five-year extension to identify and serve each of the defendants it wished 
5, No. 2:07-CV-187, 2007 WL 2867351, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2007) (applying 
the good cause test and granting the plaintiffs request for a subpoena). 
89 See Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42 (D.D.C. 
2011) (rejecting plaintiffs motion for expedited discovery); see also Hard Drive 
Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011WL3740473, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 23, 2011) (quashing subpoenas that sought identifying information for all but 
one defendant). 
90 See irifra notes 91-102 and accompanying text. 
91 See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying plaintiffs 
request for ex parte discovery, stating that discovery is inappropriate where the plain-
tiff has not shown good cause that court will have jurisdiction over the putative de-
fendants). But see Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011 
WL 1807438, at *10 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (granting the plaintiff's request for ex 
parte discovery and denying the defendants' motions to quash subpoenas aimed at 
obtaining the defendants' identifying information). 
92 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *1 (allowing plaintiff to take 
leave for expedited discovery in order to obtain identifying information for John Doe 
defendants). 
93 See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff's 
request for expedited discovery). 
94 See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. 
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to sue. 95 The court originally gave the plaintiffs until November 18, 
2010, and, after rejecting the request for a five-year extension, allowed 
the copyright holders until December 6, 2010. 96 After this instruction, 
the lawyers pared the original list of 6,230 defendants down to 868 who 
were known to or were likely to live in the district in which the case was 
filed; the remaining cases were dismissed. 97 
Some courts find issue with the uncertainty in using IP addresses as 
a means of identifying defendants. 98 A district court judge in West Vir-
ginia dismissed every defendant but one in each of the mass file-sharing 
lawsuits before his court. 99 The judge also demanded that each case be 
filed separately and that plaintiffs only submit IP addresses likely to cor-
respond to internet users in West Virginia. 100 Other commentators note 
that an IP address is only a starting point for investigation and is not evi-
dence of guilt and by filing suit against defendants based only on their IP 
addresses, the copyright holders filing mass P2P file-sharing cases across 
the country are not relying on thorough investigation. 101 Expressing dis-
favor for file sharing lawsuits, Judge Baker of Illinois stated that, "the 
court is concerned that the expedited ex parte discovery is a fishing ex-
pedition by means of a perversion of the purpose and intent of Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 102 
95 See Achte/Nuente Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & Co. KG v. Does 1-
4,577, No. 10-453 (RMC), 2010 WL 4905811, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2010) (denying 
plaintiffs request for extension of time to identify defendants in that doing so would 
be prejudicial to already named defendants). 
96 See id. (holding that plaintiff must serve the court by December 6, 2010 
with the complaint identifying defendants by name and address over whom the plain-
tiff reasonably believes the court will have personal jurisdiction). 
97 See Nate Anderson, US Copyright Group Drops 5000 P2P Defendants 
from Case, AR.s TECHNICA (Dec. 7, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/12/us-copyright-group-drops-5 ,OOO-p2p-defendants-from-cases.ars 
(limiting amount of time plaintiff could take to determine identities of anonymous 
users). 
98 See irifra notes 100-102 and accompanying text. 
99 See Nate Anderson, Judge Kills Massive P2P Porn Lawsuit, Kneecaps 
Copyright Trolls, AR.s TECHNICA (Dec. 17, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/12/judge-kills-massive-p2p-pom-lawsuit-kneecaps-copyright-
troll.ars (dismissing defendants in file sharing case). 
100 See id. (severing defendants and requiring plaintiff to identify defendants 
likely to reside in West Virginia). 
101 See Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses aren't 
Enough to Find File-Swappers, AR.s TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-find-
file-swappers.ars (suggesting that, in most cases, IP addresses do not identify particu-
lar individuals). 
102 See Nate Anderson, Judge: P2P Class Action Suit Looks Like a Fishing 
Expedition, AR.s TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011 /03/judge-p2p-class-action-suit-looks-like-a-fishing-expedition.ars 
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policy/news/2010/12/judge-kills-massive-p2p-porn-lawsuit-kneecaps-copyright-
troll.ars (dismissing defendants in file sharing case). 
100 See id. (severing defendants and requiring plaintiff to identify defendants 
likely to reside in West Virginia). 
101 See Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses aren't 
Enough to Find File-Swappers, A.Rs TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011), 
http ://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011 /08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-find-
file-swappers.ars (suggesting that, in most cases, IP addresses do not identify particu-
lar individuals). 
102 See Nate Anderson, Judge: P2P Class Action Suit Looks Like a Fishing 
Expedition, A.Rs TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/03/judge-p2p-class-action-suit-looks-like-a-fishing-expedition.ars 
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Although the file-sharing cases raise a variety of procedural issues, 
the copyright law issues in these cases are straightforward. 103 Generally, 
c_ourt~ ho_ld that the plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of copy-
~ght infringement in that "1) [plaintiffs have] ownership of a valid copy-
nght, and 2) [there was] copying [by the defendant] of constituent ele-
ments of the work that are original."104 Thus, the prima facie case is gen-
~rally satisfied by the copyright holder's complaint, 105 which would typ-
ically allege that the plaintiffs own the copyrighted movie at issue, and 
that the defendants used a P2P network to download and distribute copy-
" h d · 106 ng te music. Moreover, the use of P2P file sharing to download and 
distribute copyrighted files has been held to constitute copyright in-
frin 107 gement. Courts have consequently held that such a complaint suf-
ficiently states a claim and supporting factual basis for copyright in-
fringement. 108 
Few defendants contest the copyright infringement aspect of the case 
and instead, John Doe defendants raise an assortment of procedural de-
fenses. 109 For instance, in Voltage Pictures, 119 of the putative defend-
ants filed a variety of motions to protect their identifying information or 
b d. . d fr 110 to e isrmsse om the case. Seventy-one defendants filed motions 
to quash subpoenas issued to ISPs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
45, which requires a court to quash a subpoena when it "requires disclo-
(expressing concern that allowing discovery without hearing from the adversarial 
party would be unfair). 
103 See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. 
. 
104 Feist Publ'ns~ Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (set-
tmg forth elements of pnma facie case of copyright infringement) 
105 s . 
ee, e.g., LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 
~ 544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) (concluding that the plaintiffs "suffi-
ciently stated a claim and supporting factual basis for copyright infringement"). 
106 This showing typically includes an exhibit detailing the P2P network used, 
an IP address for each defendant, and the date and time the particular file was down-
~oa~ed. See id. (finding complaint sufficient to provide prima facie case of copyright 
mfringement). 
107 See Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565-66 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14 
(~th Cir. 200~)) (holding that the use ofNapster to download and distribute copy-
nghted matenals constitutes copyright infringement). 
108 s 
ee LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *2 (establishing prima facie 
claim of copyright infringement based on plaintiff's complaint). 
109 See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, 2011WL1807438, at *1 
(D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (indicating that 119 defendants raised motions to quash sub-
poenas sent to ISPs for identifying information on various grounds including lack of 
personal jurisdiction and improper joinder). 
110 See id. (describing defendants' various motions to protect their identifying 
information). 
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sure of privileged or other protected matter."lll Thirty-five ~~fend~i:ts 
filed motions for protective orders to protect disclosure of therr identities 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26( c ), which provides that a court 
may "issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." 112 Seven defendants 
filed motions to dismiss based on improper joinder. 113 Finally, forty-two 
putative defendants filed motions to dismiss based o_n lack of _Personal 
jurisdiction. 114 While the court in Voltage Pict~res ultlfilately re~ ected_ all 
of the defendants' motions, other courts have given greater consideration 
to defendants' motions. 115 Of the motions raised by defendants in file-
sharing lawsuits, the two most frequently raised, and which generate the 
most disagreement among district courts, are the motions for dismissal 
for lack of personal jurisdiction and for dismissal based on improper 
.. d 116 
JOlll er. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Discovery 
Prior to being named in the suit, most John Doe defendants seek 
dismissal from the file sharing suits based on lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. 117 Once a defendant raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdic-
tion the burden of establishing a prima facie case of pertinent jurisdic-
tion~! facts shifts to the plaintiff. 118 To meet this burden, a plaintiff will 
normally be afforded the opportunity to engage in the discovery neces-
111 Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (setting 
forth requirements for obtaining a civil subpoena). 
112 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *4 (holding that because 
defendants are not subject to subpoenas issued by plaintiff, defendants suffer noun-
due burden from plaintiff's discovery request). 
113 See id. (arguing that defendants are improperly joined). 
114 See id. at *8 (asserting that court does not have personal jurisdiction over 
defendant). , 
115 See id. at *IO (stating that defendants failed to demonstrate that subpoenas 
should be quashed, protected orders are warranted, or that defendants should other-
wise be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper j oinder). 
116 For a further discussion of how courts have ruled regarding personal juris-
diction and joinder in John Doe file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 117-167 and 
accompanying text. . . . 
117 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *8 (contestmg personalJuns-
diction and supplying affidavits to show that defendants do not reside or transact 
business in district in which suit has been brought); see also West Coast Prods., Inc. 
v. Does 1-5829, No. 11-57 (CKK), 2011WL2292239, at *4 (D.D.C. June 10, 2011) 
(arguing that because defendants have no contact with forum jurisdiction, personal 
jurisdiction is lacking). 
118 See West Coast, 2011WL2292239, at *14 (citing First Chicago Int'! v. 
United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
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(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14 
(~th Cir. 200~)) (holding that the use ofNapster to download and distribute copy-
nghted matenals constitutes copyright infringement). 
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claim o&~opyright infringement based on plaintiff's complaint). 
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sure of privileged or other protected matter." m Thirty-five ~~fend~i:its 
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Prior to being named in the suit, most John Doe defendants seek 
dismissal from the file sharing suits based on lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. 117 Once a defendant raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdic-
tion the burden of establishing a prima facie case of pertinent jurisdic-
tion~! facts shifts to the plaintiff. 118 To meet this burden, a plaintiff will 
normally be afforded the opportunity to engage in the discovery neces-
111 Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (setting 
forth requirements for obtaining a civil subpoena). 
112 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *4 (holding that because 
defendants are not subject to subpoenas issued by plaintiff, defendants suffer noun-
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115 See id. at * 10 (stating that defendants failed to demonstrate that subpoenas 
should be quashed, protected orders are warranted, or that defendants should other-
wise be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper joinder). 
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diction and joinder in John Doe file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 117-167 and 
accompanying text. . . . 
117 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *8 (contesting personalJuns-
diction and supplying affidavits to show that defendants do not reside or transact 
business in district in which suit has been brought); see also West Coast Prods., Inc. 
v. Does 1-5829, No. 11-57 (CKK), 2011WL2292239, at *4 (D.D.C. June 10, 2011) 
(arguing that because defendants have no contact with forum jurisdiction, personal 
jurisdiction is lacking). 
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sary to determine jurisdictional facts. 119 Otherwise, where the plaintiffs 
have little information about the defendants, generally limited to the de-
fendants' IP addresses and method of engagement in the infringing activ-
ity, the court has no way to evaluate defendants' jurisdictional defens-
es. 120 
In order to establish personal jurisdiction, a court must examine 
whether personal jurisdiction is proper under the state's long arm statute, 
and also whether jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of due process. 121 
"Due process requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has 'mini-
mum contacts' with the forum, thereby ensuring that 'the defendant's 
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."122 
In Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, the court employed 
the prototypical analysis of personal jurisdiction and jurisdictional dis-
covery in John Doe type file sharing suits. 123 The court began its analysis 
by noting that the District of Columbia's standard for permitting jurisdic-
tional discovery is quite liberal. 124 Specifically, in the District of Colum-
bia, jurisdictional discovery is available when a party has "at least a good 
faith belief' that it has personal jurisdiction. 125 Setting this low threshold 
for allowing jurisdictional discovery, the court in Call of the Wild Movie 
held that it was premature to address personal jurisdiction before the 
plaintiff had the opportunity to discover relevant jurisdictional infor-
119 See id. (citing GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 
1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (allowing for discovery of pertinent jurisdictional facts 
where the information available is plainly insufficient to assess defendants' jurisdic-
tional defenses). 
120 See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 346; see also London-Sire 
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 180-81 (D. Mass. 2008) (permitting 
plaintiff to engage in jurisdictional discovery and stating that it is premature to adju-
dicate personal jurisdiction); see also Sony Music Entm 't Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 567 
(stating that evaluating personal jurisdiction is premature without defendants' identi-
fying information). 
121 See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (setting forth require-
ments of personal jurisdiction). 
122 Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
297 (1980)). 
123 See id. at 346 (assessing defendants' claim of lack ofpersonaljurisdic-
tion). 
124 See id. (observing that jurisdictional discovery has been permitted even 
without establishment of prima facie case of personal jurisdiction). 
125 See id. (citing Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 
F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
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mation about the John Doe defendants, and thus granted the plaintiffs 
. di . 1 di 126 juns ct10na scovery request. 
Although courts generally allow plaintiffs to undertake jurisdictional 
discovery, the court in Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,222 rejected the cop-
yright holder's motion to take leave for expedited discovery and issue 
subpoenas upon ISPs in order to determine the identifying information of 
the defendants. 127 In rejecting the plaintiffs motion for expedited dis-
covery, the court stated that it "has broad discretion in its resolution of 
discovery problems that arise in cases pending before it." 128 The court 
limited Nu Image's suit to those defendants whom Nu Image had "good 
cause" to believe resided within the District of Columbia. 129 In support 
of this holding, the court further stated that it must consider the "delay 
and unproductive utilization of court resources" in prosecuting a lawsuit 
in which the vast majority of defendants would have to be dismissed 
after discovery revealed that they did not reside in the District of Colum-
b. 130 Ia. 
[I]n deciding whether a request comes within the discovery 
rules, a court is not required to blind itself to the purpose for 
which a party seeks information. Thus, when the purpose of a 
discovery request is to gather information for use in proceed-
ings other than the pending suit, discovery properly is de-
nied.131 
This decision prompted Nu Image to voluntarily abandon the suit 
against the twenty thousand odd defendants, including the defendants 
that did live in the District of Columbia. 132 
The court's holding in Nu Image turned on an analysis of personal 
jurisdiction, despite the fact that the Doe defendants had yet to be named 
126 See id. at 345 (holding that Court is in no position to evaluate the defend-
ants' specific connections with the District of Columbia, and that quashing subpoenas 
would bar the plaintiffs from obtaining discovery relevant to that evaluation). 
127 See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (rejecting plaintiffs motion to take 
leave for ex parte discovery). 
128 Id. (citing Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
129 See id. (limiting the defendants that could be named in the suit). 
130 See id. at 41 (taking into consideration efficient utilization of judicial 
resources). 
131 Id. (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 43 7 U.S. 340, 352 n.17 
(1978)). . 
132 See The Expendables Makers Dismiss Massive BitTorrent Lawsuit, 
TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 25, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-expendables-makers-
dismiss-massive-bittorrent-lawsuit-110825/ (revealing that Nu Image dropped its suit 
against all defendants upon court's refusal to grant jurisdictional discovery). 
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Many John Doe defendants argue that the copyright holders' sub-
poenas requesting the defendants' identifying information should be 
quashed on the basis that the defendants were improperly joined into a 
single action. 140 Permissive joinder, governed by Rule 20 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that individuals: 
may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to 
relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alter-
native with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) 
any question oflaw or fact common to all defendants will arise 
in the action. 141 
"The purpose of Rule 20 is 'to promote trial convenience and expe-
dite the final resolution of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits, 
extra expense to the parties, and loss of time to the court as well as the 
litigants appearing before it. "'142 The Supreme Court has indicated that 
the rules of j oinder are to be broadly construed and has stated that ') oin-
der of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." 143 Where 
j oinder is found to be inappropriate, the remedy is not dismissal of the 
action, but rather, dropping parties to the suit and severing claims against 
those parties in accordance with Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 144 
Although the Supreme Court takes a favorable stance towards join-
der, judges have the discretion to sever and dismiss defendants to avoid 
causing prejudice and unfairness to the defendants--even if the court 
found that j oinder of the John Does met the requirements of Rule 
20(a). 145 For example, the court in Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does 
1-188 chose to exercise discretion and severed all but one defendant, 
140 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *4 (asking court to findjoin-
der improper and sever defendants). 
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). 
142 West Coast, 275 F.R.D at 15 (quoting M.K. v. Tenet, 216 F.R.D. 133, 137 
(D.D.C. 2002)). 
143 See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure 
in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1049, 1108 (2008) (quoting United 
Mineworkers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)). 
144 See FED. R. CIV. P. 21. See Voltage Pictures, at *4 (explaining that im-
proper joinder is only remedied by severance of defendants rather than dismissal of 
suit). 
145 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (noting that even ifrequirements of 
Rule 20(a) are met, "court[s] must examine whether permissible joinder would 'com-
port with the principles of fundamental fairness' or would result in prejudice to either 
side."' (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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Many John Doe defendants argue that the copyright holders' sub-
poenas requesting the defendants' identifying information should be 
quashed on the basis that the defendants were improperly joined into a 
single action. 140 Permissive joinder, governed by Rule 20 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that individuals: 
may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to 
relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alter-
native with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) 
any question oflaw or fact common to all defendants will arise 
in the action. 141 · 
"The purpose of Rule 20 is 'to promote trial convenience and expe-
dite the final resolution of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits, 
extra expense to the parties, and loss of time to the court as well as the 
litigants appearing before it. '"142 The Supreme Court has indicated that 
the rules of j oinder are to be broadly construed and has stated that ') oin-
der of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." 143 Where 
joinder is found to be inappropriate, the remedy is not dismissal of the 
action, but rather, dropping parties to the suit and severing claims against 
those parties in accordance with Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 144 
Although the Supreme Court takes a favorable stance towards join-
der, judges have the discretion to sever and dismiss defendants to avoid 
causing prejudice and unfairness to the defendants--even if the court 
found that j oinder of the John Does met the requirements of Rule 
20(a). 145 For example, the court in Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does 
1-188 chose to exercise discretion and severed all but one defendant, 
140 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *4 (asking court to findjoin-
der improper and sever defendants). 
141 FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a)(2). 
142 West Coast, 275 F.R.D at 15 (quoting M.K. v. Tenet, 216 F.R.D. 133, 137 
(D.D.C. 2002)). 
143 See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure 
in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1049, 1108 (2008) (quoting United 
Mineworkers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)). 
144 See FED. R. C1v. P. 21. See Voltage Pictures, at *4 (explaining that im-
proper joinder is only remedied by severance of defendants rather than dismissal of 
suit). 
145 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (noting that even ifrequirements of 
Rule 20(a) are met, "court[s] must examine whether permissible joinder would 'com-
port with the principles of fundamental fairness' or would result in prejudice to either 
side."' (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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providing three justifications for doing so. 146 First, the court reasoned 
that permittingjoinder "would undermine Rule 20(a)'s purpose ofpro-
motingjudicial economy and trial convenience because it would result in 
a logistically unmanageable case."147 Second, permittingjoinder would 
force the court to address each defendant's unique defenses, resulting in 
various "mini-trials" involving different evidence and testimony. 148 Last-
ly, the court noted that permissive joinder does not comport with "no-
tions of fundamental fairness," and that j oinder would likely cause prej-
udice to putative defendants. 149 
Aside from judges' discretionary decisions to sever the defendants, 
BitTorrent's rise in popularity has given cause for many courts to deal 
with the question of whether the joinder of John Doe defendants who 
engage in infringing activity using BitTorrent should be treated the same 
way as joinder of defendants in earlier P2P file sharing cases. 150 In pre-
vious file-sharing cases dealing with earlier P2P networks, courts com-
monly held that the defendants' mere use of the same P2P network was 
insufficient to permit joinder of defendants. 151 Despite this body of case 
law, some courts have distinguished BitTorrent from earlier P2P net-
works. and have permitted the j oinder of those defendants who were part 
of a pa..-rticular BitTorrent "swarm."152 These courts differentiated Bit-
146 
See id. at *14 ("Even ifjoinder of the Doe Defendants ... met the re-
quirements of Rule 20(a) ... , the Court finds it is appropriate to exercise its discretion 
to sever and dismiss all but one Doe Defendant to avoid causing prejudice and unfair-
ness to Defendants, and in the interest of justice."). 
147 
See id. (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. l lC Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 232-
33 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)) (providing an example when the court held that courtrooms 
cannot accommodate large numbers of defendants, and that their attorneys could not 
try all of the plaintiff's claims together). 
148 
See id. (predicting that there may be ISP specific defenses since thirteen 
different ISPs are associated with Doe defendants in this trial). 
149 
See id. (describing logistical problems arising from joinder of all defend-
ants). 
150 
See id. (acknowledging question raised by use ofBitTorrent file-sharing 
and that district courts have answered this question inconsistently). 
151 s 
ee Laface Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL 
544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) ("[M]erely committing the same type of 
violation in the same way does not link defendants together for purposes ofjoinder."); 
see also BMG Music v. Does 1-4, No. 3:06-cv-01579-MHP, 2006 US. Dist. LEXIS 
53237, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2006) (holding that the defendants' use of the same 
P2P network and ISP to infringe the plaintiff's copyright was not sufficient to allow 
joinder of the defendants); see also Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:04-cv-
197-0rl-22DAB, 2004 US. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *JO (MD. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (find-
ing that the defendants' use of the same P2P network, FastTrack, was insufficient to 
permitjoinder). 
152 
See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (discussing differences in district 
courts' determinations of whether BitTorrent users should be joined under Fed. R. 
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Torrent from other P2P networks on the basis that BitTorrent "makes 
every downloader also an uploader of the illegally transferred file(s)." 153 
Conversely, several courts rejected this distinction and have held that the 
mere use ofBitTorrent, similar to previous P2P technologies, is not suf-
ficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 20( a), even if the defendants 
f . l " ,, 154 were part o a smg e swarm. 
Courts that permit j oinder in mass file sharing lawsuits emphasize 
that the requirements for permissive joinder under Rule 20 set forth a 
flexible test, and that courts should seek the broadest possible scope of 
action. 155 For example, the court in Voltage Pictures held that Rule 
20(a)(2)(A) "essentially requires claims asserted against joined parties to 
be 'logically related. "'156 Viewing Rule 20(a)'s requirements broadly, 
courts that allow j oinder further note that severing defendants would 
pose significant obstacles for copyright holders to protect their copy-
rights from file-sharers. 157 Preventingjoinder of defendants in file shar-
ing cases would not only force copyright holders to file individual law-
Civ. P. 20(a)); see also MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-18, 2011WL2181620, at *l (N.D. 
Cal. June 2, 2011) (noting that while joinder may be found improper later in litiga-
tion, allegation that Does infringed plaintiff's copyright through BitTorrent was suffi-
cient to satisfy Rule 20(a) at pleading stage); see also Voltage Pictures, WL 1807438, 
at *5 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (holding that "the impulse is toward entertaining the 
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; [and] joinder 
of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged" (quoting United Mine Work-
ers of Am., v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)); see also Call of the Wild Movie, 770 
F. Supp. 2d at 347; see also West Coast Prods., 275 F.R.D. at 14 (discussing that 
defendants are properly joined since they participated in a transaction to download a 
movie using the BitTorrent file sharing protocol). 
153 E.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (internal quotation 
omitted). 
154 See Hard Drive, 2011WL3740473, at *13-14 (holding that permissive 
joinder of all defendants is improper even if defendants were in same swarm); see 
also Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011WL3652521, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (holding that the nature ofBitTorrent protocol does not 
justify joinder of otherwise unrelated defendants); see also IO Group, Inc. v. Does 1-
19, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 WL 5071605, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (holding 
joinder improper where the only connection between infringing parties is their use of 
the same P2P network); see also LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *2 (severing 
claims against users of P2P network used to commit copyright infringement since 
there was no assertion that the defendants acted in concert); see also Elektra Entm 't 
Group, 2004 WL 2095581, at *l, *6-7 (holding that the mere use o~P2P pr~tocol w~s 
not sufficient to show that the plaintiff's copyright infringement claims agamst multi-
ple P2P users were sufficiently related for purposes of Rule· 20(a)(2)). 
155 See Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL 1807438, at *5 (establishing broad test for 
allowing joinder). 
156 Id. (other citations omitted). 
157 See Call of the Wild, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 
(D.D.C. 2011) (examining the difficulties that severance would pose for copyright 
holders). 
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ly, the court noted that permissive joinder does not comport with "no-
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with the question of whether the j oinder of John Doe defendants who 
engage in infringing activity using BitTorrent should be treated the same 
way as joinder of defendants in earlier P2P file sharing cases. 150 In pre-
vious file-sharing cases dealing with earlier P2P networks, courts com-
monly held that the defendants' mere use of the same P2P network was 
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of a pa..-rticular BitTorrent "swarm."152 These courts differentiated Bit-
146 
See id. at *14 ("Even if joinder of the Doe Defendants ... met the re-
quirements of Rule 20(a) ... , the Court finds it is appropriate to exercise its discretion 
to sever and dismiss all but one Doe Defendant to avoid causing prejudice and unfair-
ness to Defendants, and in the interest of justice."). 
147 See id. (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. I IC Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 232-
33 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)) (providing an example when the court held that courtrooms 
cannot accommodate large numbers of defendants, and that their attorneys could not 
try all of the plaintiff's claims together). 
148 
See id. (predicting that there may be ISP specific defenses since thirteen 
different ISPs are associated with Doe defendants in this trial). 
149 See id. (describing logistical problems arising from joinder of all defend-
ants). 
150 
See id. (acknowledging question raised by use ofBitTorrent file-sharing 
and that district courts have answered this question inconsistently). 
151 (Y 
0ee LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL 
544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) ("[M]erely committing the same type of 
violation in the same way does not link defendants together for purposes ofjoinder."); 
see also BMG Music v. Does 1-4, No. 3:06-cv-01579-MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
53237, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2006) (holding that the defendants' use of the same 
P2P network and ISP to infringe the plaintiff's copyright was not sufficient to allow 
joinder of the defendants); see also Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:04-cv-
197-0rl-22DAB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *JO (MD. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (find-
ing that the defendants' use of the same P2P network, FastTrack, was insufficient to 
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152 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (discussing differences in district 
courts' determinations of whether BitTorrent users should be joined under Fed. R. 
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Torrent from other P2P networks on the basis that BitTorrent "makes 
every downloader also an uploader of the illegallytransferredfile(s)."153 
Conversely, several courts rejected this distinction and have held that the 
mere use ofBitTorrent, similar to previous P2P technologies, is not suf-
ficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 20( a), even if the defendants 
f . 1 " "154 were part o a smg e swarm. 
Courts that permit j oinder in mass file sharing lawsuits emphasize 
that the requirements for permissive joinder under Rule 20 set forth a 
flexible test, and that courts should seek the broadest possible scope of 
action. 155 For example, the court in Voltage Pictures held that Rule 
20(a)(2)(A) "essentially requires claims asserted against joined parties to 
be 'logically related. "'156 Viewing Rule 20(a)'s requirements broadly, 
courts that allow j oinder further note that severing defendants would 
pose significant obstacles for copyright holders to protect their copy-
rights from file-sharers. 157 Preventingjoinder of defendants in file shar-
ing cases would not only force copyright holders to file individual law-
Civ. P. 20(a)); see also MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-18, 2011WL2181620, at *I (N.D. 
Cal. June 2, 2011) (noting that while joinder may be found improper later in litiga-
tion, allegation that Does infringed plaintiff's copyright through BitTorrent was suffi-
cient to satisfy Rule 20(a) at pleading stage); see also Voltage Pictures, WL 1807438, 
at *5 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (holding that "the impulse is toward entertaining the 
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; [and] joinder 
of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged" (quoting United Mine Work-
ers of Am., v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)); see also Call of the Wild Movie, 770 
F. Supp. 2d at 347; see also West Coast Prods., 275 F.R.D. at 14 (discussing that 
defendants are properly joined since they participated in a transaction to download a 
movie using the BitTorrent file sharing protocol). 
153 E.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (internal quotation 
omitted). 
154 See Hard Drive, 2011WL3740473, at *13-14 (holding that permissive 
joinder of all defendants is improper even if defendants were in same swarm); see 
also Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011WL3652521, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (holding that the nature ofBitTorrent protocol does not 
justify joinder of otherwise unrelated defendants); see also IO Group, Inc. v. Does 1-
19, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 WL 5071605, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (holding 
joinder improper where the only connection between infringing parties is their use of 
the same P2P network); see also LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *2 (severing 
claims against users of P2P network used to commit copyright infringement since 
there was no assertion that the defendants acted in concert); see also Elektra Entm 't 
Group, 2004 WL 2095581, at *I, *6-7 (holding that the mere use ofP2P protocol was 
not sufficient to show that the plaintiff's copyright infringement claims against multi-
ple P2P users were sufficiently related for purposes of Rule' 20(a)(2)). 
155 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *5 (establishing broad test for 
allowing joinder). 
156 Id. (other citations omitted). 
157 See Call of the Wild, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 
(D.D.C. 2011) (examining the difficulties that severance would pose for copyright 
holders). 
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suits against each infringer, it would also require the copyright holders to 
issue separate subpoenas to ISPs for each defendant's identifying infor-
mation. 158 Additionally, copyright holders would have to pay separate 
filing fees for each individual case. 159 Consequently, it is "highly unlike-
ly" that copyright holders could protect their copyrights in a cost-
effective manner. 160 However, one court that permitted j oinder conceded 
that "at some point, the sheer number of putative defendants involved in 
a single case may necessitate severance."161 
Espousing the view that j oinder of BitT orrent file-sharers is improp-
er, the court in Diabolic Video Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-2099 held 
that j oinder was improper even where the defendants were part of the 
same "swarm."
162 The court inDiabolic analyzed the cases allowing for 
joinder of John Doe defendants and observed that in each of the cases 
allowing for joinder of the defendants, the courts relied on the proposi-
tion that a file sharing protocol like BitTorrent "makes every downloader 
also an uploader of the illegally transferred file(s)." 163 In rejecting this 
distinction, the court in Diabolic stated that courts allowingjoinder fail 
to explain how or why the technical architecture of BitT orrent is any 
different from the file sharing protocols considered in previous P2P file 
sharing cases such as LaFace Records, Intersco'Pe Records or BMG 
164 ' Music. In each of these cases, the mere fact that the defendants used 
the same ISP and P2P file sharing protocol was held insufficient to justi-
fy joinder of otherwise unrelated defendants in a single action. 165 
158 See id. (noting inconvenience to copyright holders in managing individual 
lawsuits against each John Doe defendant). 
159 See id. (considering the financial burden that would be placed on the copy-
right holder in paying separate filing fees for suits against each individual defendant). 
160 See id. at 345 (findingjoinder proper so that copyright holders can effi-
ciently and cost effectively protect their copyrights). 
161 See Voltage Pictures, 2011-WL 1807438, at *8 (recognizing administra-
tive burdens on court and judicial economy posed by the number of putative defend-
ants). 
162 See Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *4 (indicating that the allegation that 
defendants participated in the same swarm is not sufficient to permit joinder). 
163 
Id. (observing the rationale employed by courts permitting joinder of de-
fendants who engaged in copyright infringement via BitTorrent); see also Call of the 
Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 342-43. 
164 See Diabolic, 2011WL3100404, at *4 (listing cases in which the defend-
ants' use of previous P2P networks was not sufficient to permitjoinder between oth-
erwise unrelated defendants). 
165 See LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *3 (holding that defendants' 
use of same ISP and P2P network, without more, was insufficient to permitjoinder 
under Rule 20); see also BMG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53237, at *5-6, (severing 
defendants sua sponte where the connection between the defendants was merely the 
use of the same ISP to engage in infringing activity); see also Interscope Records, 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2 77 82, at * 10 (holding that joinder of defendants is improper 
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Further, courts finding joinder improper, have noted that although 
plaintiffs place an emphasis on the fact that the defendants were in the 
same swarm, plaintiffs' exhibits attached to their complaint generally 
indicate the activity of the different IP addresses occurred on different 
days, and at different times, making the allegation that the John Does 
acted in concert far less persuasive. 166 Similarly, one court concluded 
that the plaintiffs allegation that John Doe defendants met Rule 20(a)'s 
joinder requirements was speculative and conclusory since plaintiff as-
serted that "each defendant is a possible source of the Plaintiffs' file, and 
may be held responsible for distributing the file to the other defend-
t "167 ans. 
IV. RESOLVING PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
As many courts have recognized, John Doe lawsuits are the copy-
right holder's only means of recourse against the massive onset of 
online copyright infringement facilitated by P2P networks. 168 The 
inapplicability of the DMCA § 512(h) subpoena, which would allow 
for identification of the defendants prior to filing suit, necessitates the 
filing of John Doe lawsuits. 169 Moreover, the DMCA safe harbor pro-
visions shelter ISPs from any liability for infringing activity over P2P 
networks, leaving copyright holders without recourse against ISPs. 170 
Lastly, the decentralized nature of P2P networks makes it unlikely 
that copyright holders could successfully bring action against the par-
ent corporation of the P2P network since the central servers do not 
store the copyrighted content, as N apster did. 171 
where defendants merely used the same P2P network to engage in copyright in-
fringement). 
166 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (commenting that although defend-
ants may have participated in the same swarm, it is likely that each user's file sharing 
activity occurred at different times on different days). 
167 Id. at *15 (emphasizing uncertainty related to plaintiffs theory of concert-
ed action required for joinder of defendants under Rule 20). 
168 See supra note 89 and accompanying text for a discussion of copyright 
holders' limited means of recovery against file sharers. 
169 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of a DMCA 
section 512(h) subpoena as applied in mass file sharing lawsuits. 
170 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text for 
a discussion of how ISPs are protected from liability for infringing activity of their 
subscribers. 
171 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for a further discussion of 
how BitTorrent' s architecture protects the parent corporation from infringement 
claims. 
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to explain how or why the technical architecture of BitTorrent is any 
different from the file sharing protocols considered in previous P2P file 
sharing cases such as LaFace Records, Intersco'Pe Records or BMG 
164 ' Music. In each of these cases, the mere fact that the defendants used 
the same ISP and P2P file sharing protocol was held insufficient to justi-
fy joinder of otherwise unrelated defendants in a single action. 165 
158 See id. (noting inconvenience to copyright holders in managing individual 
lawsuits against each John Doe defendant). 
159 See id. (considering the financial burden that would be placed on the copy-
right holder in paying separate filing fees for suits against each individual defendant). 
160 See id. at 345 (findingjoinder proper so that copyright holders can effi-
ciently and cost effectively protect their copyrights). 
161 See Voltage Pictures, 2011-WL 1807438, at *8 (recognizing administra-
tive burdens on court and judicial economy posed by the number of putative defend-
ants). 
162 See Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *4 (indicating that the allegation that 
defendants participated in the same swarm is not sufficient to permit joinder). 
163 
Id. (observing the rationale employed by courts permitting joinder of de-
fendants who engaged in copyright infringement via BitTorrent); see also Call of the 
Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 342-43. 
164 See Diabolic, 2011WL3100404, at *4 (listing cases in which the defend-
ants' use of previous P2P networks was not sufficient to permitjoinder between oth-
erwise unrelated defendants). 
165 
See LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *3 (holding that defendants' 
use of same ISP and P2P network, without more, was insufficient to permit joinder 
under Rule 20); see also BMG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53237, at *5-6, (severing 
defendants sua sponte where the connection between the defendants was merely the 
use of the same ISP to engage in infringing activity); see also Interscope Records, 
2004 US. Dist. LEXIS 2 77 82, at * 10 (holding that joinder of defendants is improper 
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Further, courts finding joinder improper, have noted that although 
plaintiffs place an emphasis on the fact that the defendants were in the 
same swarm, plaintiffs' exhibits attached to their complaint generally 
indicate the activity of the different IP addresses occurred on different 
days, and at different times, making the allegation that the John Does 
acted in concert far less persuasive. 166 Similarly, one court concluded 
that the plaintiffs allegation that John Doe defendants met Rule 20( a)' s 
joinder requirements was speculative and conclusory si~ce_ pl~intiff as-
serted that "each defendant is a possible source of the Plamtiffs file, and 
may be held responsible for distributing the file to the other defend-
t ,,167 ans. 
IV. RESOLVING PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
As many courts have recognized, John Doe lawsuits are the copy-
right holder's only means of recourse against the massive onset of 
online copyright infringement facilitated by P2P networks. 168 The 
inapplicability of the DMCA § 512(h) subpoena, which would allow 
for identification of the defendants prior to filing suit, necessitates the 
filing of John Doe lawsuits. 169 Moreover, the DMCA safe harbor pro-
visions shelter ISPs from any liability for infringing activity over P2P 
networks, leaving copyright holders without recourse against ISPs. 170 
Lastly, the decentralized nature of P2P networks makes it unlikely 
that copyright holders could successfully bring action against the par-
ent corporation of the P2P network since the central servers do not 
N d'd 171 store the copyrighted content, as apster 1 . 
where defendants merely used the same P2P network to engage in copyright in-
fringement). 
166 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (commenting that although defend-
ants may have participated in the same swarm, it is likely that each user's file sharing 
activity occurred at different times on different days). 
167 Id. at *15 (emphasizing uncertainty related to plaintiff's theory of concert-
ed action required for joinder of defendants under Rule 20). 
168 See supra note 89 and accompanying text for a discussion of copyright 
holders' limited means of recovery against file sharers. 
169 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of a DMCA 
section 512(h) subpoena as applied in mass file sharing lawsuits. 
170 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text for 
a discussion of how ISPs are protected from liability for infringing activity of their 
subscribers. 
171 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for a further discussion of 
how BitTorrent's architecture protects the parent corporation from infringement 
claims. 
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. John Doe laws~ts are a burdensome means of resolution for cop-
yright holders seeking redress against infringers and are "time con-
suming[,] ... cumbersome and expensive." 172 Given this difficult 
state of affairs, it is troubling to copyright holders that even John Doe 
lawsuits encounter a gamut of procedural objections that various 
courts have sustained. 
173 
fu addition to judicial resistance to the mass 
file sharing law.suits, media reports of the John Doe lawsuits are large-
ly unsympathetic to the problems of copyright holders. 174 The mass 
suits against thousands of defendants have been likened to judicially 
sponsored extortion and derided as "fishing expeditions." 175 It is im-
portant for courts to be cognizant of this background when detennin-
ing procedural questions raised in the mass file-sharing lawsuits since 
the resolution of procedural matters has significant effects on both 
copyright holders' ability to recover against file-sharers, and on file-
sharers' privacy rights. 176 
A. When to Address Personal Jurisdiction 
. . D.efendants. c~mmon!y raise defenses based on a lack of personal 
JDnsdiction, clamung to lack the required "minimum contacts" with 
the forum to defeat personal jurisdiction. 177 fu addressing these de-
fenses, many courts have held that copyright holders should be al-
lowed to conduct discovery of defendants' identifying infonnation 
prior to addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction. 178 The court in 
17~ S~e Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL 1807438, at *8 (quoting In re Charter 
Commumcalions Inc., Subpoena Enfurcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 782 (8th Cir. 2005) (Murphy, J., dissenting)). 
. 
173 
See id at *7-8 (observing that courts have varying thresholds for the exer-
cise of d1scr~t10n to sever defendants, and that courts must weigh the administrative 
burdens agamst the challenges presented to copyright holders in protecting their works). 
174 
See Jonathan Berr, "The Hurt Locker" Producers Launch Lawsuit Attack 
Against Pirates, DAILY FINANCE (May 12, 201 OJ (questioning whether piracy has 
actually resulted m revenue losses at the box office and suggesting that these suits 
may cause public backlash). 
175 (Y An 
176 iJee derson, supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 168-17 5 and accompanying text. 
in " p· y· v·d 
iJee, e.g., rrst IIDe 1 eos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011 
WL 3498227, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (submitting affidavits indicating that the 




See id at *9 (announcing that lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be raised 
until after defendants are named as parties); see also Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL 
1807 4 3 8, at *9 ( fin~ing that until. the plaintiffu have been given an opportunity to 
discover defendants 1denlifying mfonnation, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion Is improper); see also West Coast, 275 F.R.D. at 14-15 (holding that prior to 
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Nu Image departed from this line of cases ~n~ re~sed to ~llow the 
laintiffs to discover the defendants' ident1fymg mformat10n because 
fhe plaintiffs lacked a good faith belief
7
\hat the court would have per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendants. Despite the dec1s10n reached 
in Nu Image, personal jurisdiction is properly addressed only a~~r 
copyright holders have had a chance to discover the defendants iden-
tifying information. 18°First, copyright hol~ers mer~ly know the de-
fendants' IP addresses, and without more informat10n, courts hav~ no 
way to evaluate the defendants' jurisdictional defen~es and have .1u1:1-
ited information to assess alternative bases to establish. persona! Juris-
diction. 
181 
If and when putative defendants are named m the smt? t~e 
defendants will then have the opportunity to challenge personal Juris-
diction. 
182 
Second, at least one court has observed that movants gener-
ally assume they will be named as defendants once their identifying 
information is discovered. 183 However, many movants have argued 
that their internet connection was used by third parties to infringe the 
Plaintiff copyright holder's work; therefore, it is those third parties 
184 p· II who should be properly named as defendants. ma y, one co~-
mentator has argued that evaluating personal jurisdiction prior to 1d~n­
tifying the defendants is based on the idea that defendants can subIDit 
affidavits swearing to their lack of contact with the forum. 185 Affida-
identification of defendants, defenses based on personal jurisdiction are premature); 
see also Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48 (in?icati~g that court~ and 
parties are in no position to evaluate each defen~ants' connection with the ~ssociated 
forum prior to discovery of identifying informat10n); see also El~ktra Entm t ~roup, 
Inc. v. Does 1-9, 2004 WL 2095581, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (statmg that a rulmg on 
personal jurisdiction at this stage is prematur~); ~ee_ a~so ~any M_usic, 326 F. Supp. 2d 
at 567 ("A holding at this stage that personal 3unsd1ct10n is lackmg would be prema-
ture."). · · d" 179 
See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (limiting the_plamt~ff's iscovery 
request to just those defendants which plaintiff had a good faith behefwould be sub-
ject to the court's jurisdiction). . 
180 
See infra notes 181-190 and accompanymg text. 
181 
See Call of the Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (declaring tha~ ~valu~ti~g 
personal jurisdiction is premature prior to discovery of the defendants identifying 
information). 
182 
See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *9 (con:rnen.tin!S th.at defer-
ringon addressing personal jurisdiction until after discovery of ident1.fyi?g_m~or­
mation still allows defendants the opportunity to challenge personal 3unsd1ct10n). 183 
See West Coast, 275 F.R.D. at 14 (observing that movants assume they 
will be named in the suit once their identifying information is release~). . 184 
See id. (stating that third parties would be properly named~ ~mt). 185 
See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Czvzl Pr~c~dure 
in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1049, 1.10.0 (2.008) (re~ogmzmg that 
evaluating personal jurisdiction before discov_efJ'.' of ide~t1fying mformat~on would 
rely on defendants providing affidavits estabhshmg their lack of connection to fo-
rum). 
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John Doe lawsuits are a burdensome means of resolution for cop-
yright holders seeking redress against infringers and are "time con-
suming[,] ... cumbersome and expensive." 172 Given this difficult 
state of affairs, it is troubling to copyright holders that even John Doe 
lawsuits encounter a gamut of procedural objections that various 
courts have sustained. 173 In addition to judicial resistance to the mass 
file sharing lawsuits, media reports of the John Doe lawsuits are large-
ly unsympathetic to the problems of copyright holders. 174 The mass 
suits against thousands of defendants have been likened to judicially 
sponsored extortion and derided as "fishing expeditions." 175 It is im-
portant for courts to be cognizant of this background when determin-
ing procedural questions raised in the mass file-sharing lawsuits since 
the resolution of procedural matters has significant effects on both 
copyright holders' ability to recover against file-sharers, and on file-
sharers' privacy rights. 176 
A. When to Address Personal Jurisdiction 
Defendants commonly raise defenses based on a lack of personal 
jurisdiction, claiming to lack the required "minimum contacts" with 
the forum to defeat personal jurisdiction. 177 In addressing these de-
fenses, many courts have held that copyright holders should be al-
lowed to conduct discovery of defendants' identifying information 
prior to addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction. 178 The court in 
172 See Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL 1807438, at *8 (quoting In re Charter 
Communications Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 782 (8th Cir. 
2005) (Murphy, J., dissenting)). 
173 See id. at *7-8 (observing that courts have varying thresholds for the exer-
cise of discretion to sever defendants, and that courts must weigh the administrative 
burdens against the challenges presented to copyright holders in protecting their 
works). 
174 See Jonathan Berr, "The Hurt Locker" Producers Launch Lawsuit Attack 
Against Pirates, DAILY FINANCE (May 12, 2010) (questioning whether piracy has 
actually resulted in revenue losses at the box office and suggesting that these suits 
may cause public backlash). 
175 See Anderson, supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra notes 168-17 5 and accompanying text. 
177 See, e.g., First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011 
WL 3498227, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (submitting affidavits indicating that the 
defendants do not have sufficient contacts with the forum necessary to establish per-
sonal jurisdiction). 
178 See id. at *9 (announcing that lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be raised 
until after defendants are named as parties); see also Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL 
1807438, at *9 (finding that until the plaintiffs have been given an opportunity to 
discover defendants' identifying information, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion is improper); see also West Coast, 275 F.R.D. at 14-15 (holding that prior to 
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Nu Image departed from this line of cases and refused to allow the 
plaintiffs to discover the defendants' identifying information because 
the plaintiffs lacked a good faith belief that the court would have per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendants. 179 Despite the decision reached 
in Nu Image, personal jurisdiction is properly addressed only after 
copyright holders have had a chance to discover the defendants' iden-
tifying information. 18°First, copyright holders merely know the de-
fendants' IP addresses, and without more information, courts have no 
way to evaluate the defendants' jurisdictional defenses and have lim-
ited information to assess alternative bases to establish personal juris-
diction. 181 If and when putative defendants are named in the suit, the 
defendants will then have the opportunity to challenge personal juris-
diction. 182 Second, at least one court has observed that movants gener-
ally assume they will be named as defendants once their identifying 
information is discovered. 183 However, many movants have argued 
that their internet connection was used by third parties to infringe the 
plaintiff copyright holder's work; therefore, it is those third parties 
who should be properly named as defendants. 184 Finally, one com-
mentator has argued that evaluating personal jurisdiction prior to iden-
tifying the defendants is based on the idea that defendants can submit 
affidavits swearing to their lack of contact with the forum. 185 Affida-
identification of defendants, defenses based on personal jurisdiction are premature); 
see also Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 34 7-48 (indicating that courts and 
parties are in no position to evaluate each defendants' connection with the associated 
forum prior to discovery of identifying information); see also Elektra Entm't Group, 
Inc. v. Does 1-9, 2004 WL 2095581, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that a ruling on 
personal jurisdiction at this stage is premature); see also Sony Music, 326 F. Supp. 2d 
at 567 ("A holding at this stage that personal jurisdiction is lacking would be prema-
ture."). 
179 See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (limiting the plaintiff's discovery 
request to just those defendants which plaintiff had a good faith belief would be sub-
ject to the court's jurisdiction). 
180 See infra notes 181-190 and accompanying text. 
181 See Call of the Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (declaring that evaluating 
personal jurisdiction is premature prior to discovery of the defendants' identifying 
information). 
182 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *9 (commenting that defer-
ringon addressing personal jurisdiction until after discovery of identifying infor-
mation still allows defendants the opportunity to challenge personal jurisdiction). 
183 See West Coast, 275 F.R.D. at 14 (observing that movants assume they 
will be named in the suit once their identifying information is released). 
184 See id. (stating that third parties would be properly named in suit). 
185 See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure 
in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1049, 1100 (2008) (recognizing that 
evaluating personal jurisdiction before discovery of identifying information would 
rely on defendants providing affidavits establishing their lack of connection to fo-
rum). 
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vits swearing a lack of connection to the forum, however, are open to 
abuse by anonymous defendants who simply wish to be dropped from 
the suit and deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to explore connec-
tions the defendants may have to the forum that they did not them-
selves consider. 186 
Those who argue in favor of addressing personal jurisdiction prior 
to discovery of the defendants' identifying information suggest that 
plaintiffs do not have a "good faith" belief that the court will have 
personal jurisdiction. 187 Defendants have argued that copyright hold-
ers can establish a good faith belief by utilizing geolocational technol-
ogy, which helps detect an individual's location based on their IP ad-
dress. 188 Courts reject this method of establishing a good faith belief 
because geolocational technology only reveals where a defendant is 
likely to be located. 189 Further, publicly available geolocational tech-
nology is not completely accurate, and therefore does not resolve the 
question of whether personal jurisdiction is proper. 190 
B. The Division Over Joinder 
An important split in the case law ofBitTorrent file sharing law-
suits involves whether joinder of the defendants is appropriate. 191 This 
split needs to be resolved so copyright holders can plan their litigation 
strategy; otherwise, copyright holders will default to joining defend-
ants due to the potential convenience and cost efficiency, roll the dice, 
and hope the judge will not elect to sever the defendants. 192 One 
school of thought holds that, similar to previous P2P networks, the 
186 See id. at 1100-03 (discussing problems with defendants affidavits regard-
ing connection to forum). 
187 See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 
346 (D.D.C. 2011) (arguing against allowance of discovery based on the lack of a 
good faith belief). 
188 See id. (referencing reverse domain name service look-up and the Ameri-
can Registry for Internet Numbers as tools to reveal where an IP address is physically 
located). 
189 See id. at 347 (observing that available tools that help to find the physical 
location of the IP address are not entirely accurate). 
190 See id. (criticizing the uncertainty in using IP lookup tools because they 
provide only the likely location of defendants). 
191 For a further discussion of the split in case law regarding the joinder of 
defendants in mass file sharing lawsuits, see supra notes 150-154 and accompanying 
text. 
192 See Allan Gregory, The Economics of (Killing) Mass BitTorrent Lawsuits, 
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 18, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-economics-of-killing-
mass-bittorrent-lawsuits-l 10918) (explaining the incentive for copyright holders to 
file single suits naming large numbers of defendants in order to minimize court fees). 
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mere fact that the defendants all used the same P2P network is not 
enough to permitjoinder. 193 Conversely, several courts have differen-
tiated BitTorrent from previous P2P networks based on the basis that 
all users who download content on BitTorrent automatically become 
up loaders of that same content, and as such, all defendants are en-
gaged in the same transaction as required by the rules of permissive 
.. d 194 
JOlll er. 
Ultimately, courts should hold thatjoinder of defendants is im-
proper.195 Several courts have already reached this conclusion and this 
result is properly achieved through either an analysis of the require-
ments of permissive joinder, or as an exercise of judicial discretion in 
favor of fundamental fairness to defendants. 196 
Peers sharing files in a BitTorrent swarm do not meet the re-
quirements of permissive joinder set forth in Rule 20. 197Several courts 
that have dealt with copyright infringement via previous P2P net-
works have held that joinder is not proper merely because defendants 
used the same P2P network. 198 "[C]omitting the same type of viola-
tion in the same way does not link defendants together for the purpos-
es of joinder."199 Although some courts have accepted the assertion 
that BitTorrent requires a greater degree of interactivity between peers 
than previous P2P networks, this attempted distinction is unavail-
ing. 200 Courts have rejected this distinction and have specifically held 
that the nature ofBitTorrent file sharing protocol does not make join-
text. 
193 See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra notes 152-161 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 196-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
196 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (severing the defendants where 
they were engaged in downloading copyrighted files using BitTorrent); see also Boy 
Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011WL3652521, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 19, 2011) (concluding that joinder of defendants using BitTorrent was improp-
er); see also Pac. Centuryint'l Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533-(DMR), 2011 
WL 2690142, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (holding thatjoinder is inappropriate 
where all the defendants downloaded the same file using BitTorrent); see also Diabol-
ic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011WL3100404 
(N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (disallowingjoinder based merely on the defendants' use of 
BitTorrent to download the same file); see also Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1-21, 
No. 11-2258 SC, 2011WL1812786, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011) (ruling that 
joinder of BitTorrent users distributing a file within the same swarm was improper). 
197 For a discussion of cases that found joinder of file sharing defendants 
improper, see supra notes 162-167 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. 
199 LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL 
544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008). 
200 See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text. 
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vits swearing a lack of connection to the forum, however, are open to 
abuse by anonymous defendants who simply wish to be dropped from 
the suit and deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to explore connec-
tions the defendants may have to the forum that they did not them-
selves consider. 186 
Those who argue in favor of addressing personal jurisdiction prior 
to discovery of the defendants' identifying information suggest that 
plaintiffs do not have a "good faith" belief that the court will have 
personal jurisdiction. 187 Defendants have argued that copyright hold-
ers can establish a good faith belief by utilizing geolocational technol-
ogy, which helps detect an individual's location based on their IP ad-
dress.188 Courts reject this method of establishing a good faith belief 
because geolocational technology only reveals where a defendant is 
likely to be located. 189 Further, publicly available geolocational tech-
nology is not completely accurate, and therefore does not resolve the 
question of whether personal jurisdiction is proper. 190 
B. The Division Over Joinder 
An important split in the case law ofBitTorrent file sharing law-
suits involves whether joinder of the defendants is appropriate. 191 This 
split needs to be resolved so copyright holders can plan their litigation 
strategy; otherwise, copyright holders will default to joining defend-
ants due to the potential convenience and cost efficiency, roll the dice, 
and hope the judge will not elect to sever the defendants. 192 One 
school of thought holds that, similar to previous P2P networks, the 
186 See id. at 1100-03 (discussing problems with defendants affidavits regard-
ing connection to forum). 
187 See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 
346 (D .D. C. 2011) (arguing against allowance of discovery based on the lack of a 
good faith belief). 
188 See id. (referencing reverse domain name service look-up and the Ameri-
can Registry for Internet Numbers as tools to reveal where an IP address is physically 
located). 
189 See id. at 347 (observing that available tools that help to find the physical 
location of the IP address are not entirely accurate). 
190 See id. (criticizing the uncertainty in using IP lookup tools because they 
provide only the likely location of defendants). 
191 For a further discussion of the split in case law regarding the joinder of 
defendants in mass file sharing lawsuits, see supra notes 150-154 and accompanying 
text. 
192 See Allan Gregory, The Economics of (Killing) Mass BitTorrent Lawsuits, 
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 18, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-economics-of-killing-
mass-bittorrent-lawsuits-110918) (explaining the incentive for copyright holders to 
file single suits naming large numbers of defendants in order to minimize court fees). 
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mere fact that the defendants all used the same P2P network is not 
enough to permit joinder. 193 Conversely, several courts have differen-
tiated BitTorrent from previous P2P networks based on the basis that 
all users who download content on BitTorrent automatically become 
up loaders of that same content, and as such, all defendants are en-
gaged in the same transaction as required by the rules of permissive 
joinder. 194 
Ultimately, courts should hold thatjoinder of defendants is im-
proper. 195 Several courts have already reached this conclusion and this 
result is properly achieved through either an analysis of the require-
ments of permissive joinder, or as an exercise of judicial discretion in 
favor of fundamental fairness to defendants. 196 
Peers sharing files in a BitTorrent swarm do not meet the re-
quirements of permissive joinder set forth in Rule 20. 197Several courts 
that have dealt with copyright infringement via previous P2P net-
works have held that joinder is not proper merely because defendants 
used the same P2P network. 198 "[C]omitting the same type of viola-
tion in the same way does not link defendants together for the purpos-
es of joinder."199 Although some courts have accepted the assertion 
that BitTorrent requires a greater degree of interactivity between peers 
than previous P2P networks, this attempted distinction is unavail-
ing. 200 Courts have rejected this distinction and have specifically held 
that the nature ofBitTorrent file sharing protocol does not make join-
text. 
193 See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra notes 152-161 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 196-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
196 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011 
WL 3740473, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (severing the defendants where 
they were engaged in downloading copyrighted files using BitTorrent); see also Boy 
Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011WL3652521, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 19, 2011) (concluding thatjoinder of defendants using BitTorrent was improp-
er); see also Pac. Century Int'l Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533-(DMR), 2011 
WL 2690142, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (holding thatjoinder is inappropriate 
where all the defendants downloaded the same file using BitTorrent); see also Diabol-
ic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011WL3100404 
(N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (disallowingjoinder based merely on the defendants' use of 
BitTorrent to download the same file); see also Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1-21, 
No. 11-2258 SC, 2011WL1812786, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011) (ruling that 
joinder ofBitTorrent users distributing a file within the same swarm was improper). 
197 For a discussion of cases that found joinder of file sharing defendants 
improper, see supra notes 162-167 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. 
199 Laface Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL 
544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008). 
200 See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text. 
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der appropriate. 201 Courts have noted that the P2P networks at issue in 
previous P2P file sharing cases were of precisely the same P2P archi-
tecture as BitTorrent. 202 Therefore, allegations that defendants partici-
pated in a single BitTorrent swarm, usually on different days and at 
different times, are insufficient to make a valid claim of concerted 
action necessary to justify joinder of defendants. 203 
Regarding discretionary severance of defendants, courts have ob-
served that, in mass file sharing cases, "[j]oinder ... fails to promote 
trial convenience and expedition of the ultimate determination of ... 
substantive issues .... "204 This is in part due to the fact that the John 
Does are likely to present different defenses, despite having engaged 
in similar activities.205 For example, "Comcast subscriber John Doe 1 
could be an innocent parent whose internet access was abused by her 
minor child, while John Doe 2 might share a computer with a room-
mate who infringed Plaintiffs' works. John Does 3 through 203 could 
be thieves. "206 
Further, the reality of the file sharing lawsuits indicates that "the 
vast majority of the claims ... are resolved through settlement once 
the plaintiff secures information identifying the Does."207 Generally, 
file sharing cases go no further than the identification of John Doe 
defendants since copyright holders have everything they need to affect 
their goal of mass settlement. 208 Therefore, for most defendants, the 
201 See Boy Racer, 2011 WL 3652521, at *3-4 (finding it improper to distin-
guish BitTorrent's architecture from other decentralized P2P networks); see also 
Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *4 (holding that BitTorrent' s architecture is no dif-
ferent than that of previous P2P networks). 
202 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. 
203 See Boy Racer, 2011WL3652521, at *4 (finding that BitTorrent is of 
same architecture as other P2P networks where courts have found joinder improper). 
204 Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-58, No. C 11-02537 LB, 2011 WL 
3443548 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011). 
205 See id. (holding that although John Does engaged in similar activity in file 
sharing copyrighted files, multiplicity of defenses raised by each defendant would 
obscure benefits afforded by joining defendants in one suit); see also Hard Drive 
Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011WL3740473, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (holding that addressing unique defenses raised by each defend-
ant would result in mini-trials with different witnesses and evidence). 
206 Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-58, 2011 WL 3443548, at *4 (citing 
BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. Civ.A. 04-650, 2004 WL 953888, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
2004)). 
207 IO Group, Inc. v. Does 1-435, No. C 10-04382 SI, 2011WL445043, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011). 
208 See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (theorizing that plaintiffs should have 
to cure procedural defects before continuing lawsuit). 
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propriety of j oinder will never be addressed if courts defer that issue 
until after identification. 209 
[Copyright holders'] motive for seekingjoinder ... is to keep 
[their] own litigation costs down in hopes that defendants will 
accept a low initial settlement demand. However, filing one 
mass action in order to identify hundreds of doe defendants 
through pre-service discovery and facilitate mass settlement, is 
not what the joinder rules were established for. 210 
Courts tasked with adjudicating John Doe file sharing cases seem to 
be trending towards finding j oinder inappropriate and severing defend-
ants prior to identification of the John Doe defendants. 211 While some 
courts defer deciding on the issue of j oinder until after the Does have 
been identified, at least one commentator has observed that the identify-
ing information of each defendant is oflittle to no use in assessingjoin-
der. 212 Determining whether a copyright holder's claims against multiple 
defendants arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences can be evaluated based on information al-
ready known to copyright holders at the time of filing suit. 213 
Courts adjudicating John Doe file sharing cases seem to be trending 
toward findingj oinder inappropriate and severing anonymous defendants 
prior to identification.214 This protects defendants' identifying infor-
mation, which may prevent copyright holders from distributing settle-
209 See id. (suggesting thatjoinder will not be addressed because defendants 
do not choose to proceed to trial and argue their defenses). 
210 IO Group, 2011WL445043, at *6. 
211 See, e.g., Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-
PSG 2011WL3100404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (acknowledging that some 
courts have deferred the question of joinder until after allowing plaintiff to take leave 
for discovery but declining to follow such precedent). 
212 See Dickman, supra note 208, at 1114 (suggesting that question ofmis-
joinder should be decided at pleading level). But see Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 
1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011WL1807438, at *5 (D.D.C. 2011) (inquiring as to 
propriety ofjoinder without John Doe defendants' identifying information).213 See 
id. (noting plaintiff would know whether one defendant downloaded copyrighted 
work from another defendant based on observing file sharing activity, regardless of 
John Doe's identifying information). 
213 See id. (noting plaintiff would know whether one defendant downloaded copy-
righted work from another defendant based on observing file sharing activity, regard-
less of John Doe's identifying information). 
214 See, e.g., Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-
PSG, 2011WL3100404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (acknowledging, but declin-
ing to follow, some courts' practice of deferring the question of joinder until after 
plaintiffs to take leave for discovery). 
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der appropriate. 201 Courts have noted that the P2P networks at issue in 
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mate who infringed Plaintiffs' works. John Does 3 through 203 could 
be thieves. "206 
Further, the reality of the file sharing lawsuits indicates that "the 
vast majority of the claims ... are resolved through settlement once 
the plaintiff secures information identifying the Does."207 Generally, 
file sharing cases go no further than the identification of John Doe 
defendants since copyright holders have everything they need to affect 
their goal of mass settlement. 208 Therefore, for most defendants, the 
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MASS FILE SHARING LAWSUITS 361 
propriety of j oinder will never be addressed if courts defer that issue 
until after identification. 209 
[Copyright holders'] motive for seekingjoinder ... is to keep 
[their] own litigation costs down in hopes that defendants will 
accept a low initial settlement demand. However, filing one 
mass action in order to identify hundreds of doe defendants 
through pre-service discovery and facilitate mass settlement, is 
not what the joinder rules were established for. 210 
Courts tasked with adjudicating John Doe file sharing cases seem to 
be trending towards findingjoinder inappropriate and severing defend-
ants prior to identification of the John Doe defendants. 211 While some 
courts defer deciding on the issue of j oinder until after the Does have 
been identified, at least one commentator has observed that the identify-
ing information of each defendant is oflittle to no use in assessingjoin-
der. 212 Determining whether a copyright holder's claims against multiple 
defendants arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences can be evaluated based on information al-
ready known to copyright holders at the time of filing suit. 213 
Courts adjudicating John Doe file sharing cases seem to be trending 
toward findingj oinder inappropriate and severing anonymous defendants 
prior to identification.214 This protects defendants' identifying infor-
mation, which may prevent copyright holders from distributing settle-
209 See id. (suggesting thatjoinder will not be addressed because defendants 
do not choose to proceed to trial and argue their defenses). 
210 JO Group, 2011WL445043, at *6. 
211 See, e.g., Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-
PSG 2011WL3100404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (acknowledging that some 
courts have deferred the question of joinder until after allowing plaintiff to take leave 
for discovery but declining to follow such precedent). 
212 See Dickman, supra note 208, at 1114 (suggesting that question ofmis-
joinder should be decided at pleading level). But see Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 
1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011WL1807438, at *5 (D.D.C. 2011) (inquiring as to 
propriety of joinder without John Doe defendants' identifying information).213 See 
id. (noting plaintiff would know whether one defendant downloaded copyrighted 
work from another defendant based on observing file sharing activity, regardless of 
John Doe's identifying information). 
213 See id. (noting plaintiff would know whether one defendant downloaded copy-
righted work from another defendant based on observing file sharing activity, regard-
less of John Doe's identifying information). 
214 See, e.g., Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-
PSG, 2011 WL 3100404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (acknowledging, but declin-
ing to follow, some courts' practice of deferring the question of joinder until after 
plaintiffs to take leave for discovery). 
362 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:2] 
ment letters to innocent or otherwise incorrectly named defendants. 215 Jn 
Gillespie v. Civiletti, the Ninth Circuit recognized an exception to the 
general allowance of discovery of anonymous users' identifying infor-
mation. 216 Gillespie held that where the identities of putative defendants 
are unknown at the time of filing the complaint, the plaintiffs should be 
provided an opportunity to discover defendants' identities, unless one of 
two conditions applies. 217 The first is where discovery would not reveal 
the identities of the unknown defendants, and the second-more im-
portant in this context-is where the claim against the defendant could 
be dismissed. 218 At least one court has held that the second Gillespie 
condition is not satisfied, and discovery should be disallowed, where the 
defendants are improperly joined.219 
These conditions are imposed so that "[p ]eople who have committed 
no wrong . . . can participate online without fear that someone who 
wishes to harass or embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and 
thereby gain the power of the court's order to discover their identity. "220 
This sentiment is particularly applicable for innocent John Doe defend-
ants who would likely face a settlement letter if courts allowed discovery 
of their identities. 221 
CONCLUSION 
Offering copyright holders protection from infringement while 
shielding innocent defendants from the judicially sponsored "extortion" 
of mass file sharing lawsuits requires action by the courts or congres-
sional intervention. 222 Many scholars support long-term, non-litigious 
solutions to combat piracy and address copyright holders' problems with 
illegal file sharing of copyrighted materials, such as a scheme of collec-
tive rights licensing or an extension ofDMCA section 512(h) subpoena 
provision to cover P2P file sharing-but no such remedy enjoys wide-
215 See iefra notes 216-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
text. 
216 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 
217 See Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *2 (reciting holding of Gillespie). 
218 See id. (setting forth two Gillespie exceptions to providing plaintiff oppor-
tunity to discover defendants' identifying information). 
219 See id. at *3 (failing to satisfy second Gillespie condition because defend-
ants should be dismissed based on improper joinder). 
220 Id. (quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 
(N.D. Cal. 1999)). 
221 See id. (protecting innocent internet users from harassment and embar-
rassment). 
222 See supra notes 12 and 171 and accompanying text. 
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spread acceptance. 223 Meanwhile, mass file sharing lawsuits against John 
Does continue to proliferate, affecting the lives of over 200,000 individ-
uals across the country since 2010. 
224 
Resolution of mass file sharing lawsuits hinges primarily upon the 
way in which district court judges address the procedural issues raised in 
these cases. 225 Voltage Pictures and Nu Image best exemplify the signifi-
cant ramifications of judges' differing resolutions of procedural issues 
raised by John Doe file sharing lawsuits.226 In Voltage Pictures, the court 
allowed j oinder of 5000 defendants and deferred ruling on personal ju-
risdiction until after the John Doe defendants were identified, allowing 
the release of identifying information and distribution of settlement let-
ters to all defendants.227 Conversely, the court in Nu Image disallowed 
discovery of 23,322 defendants' identifying information because the 
copyright holders could not show a good faith belief that the court would 
have personal jurisdiction over the defendants.228 The decision to limit 
discovery in Nu Image led the copyright holder to drop the suit and al-
lowed all 23,322 defendants to walk away free ofliability.
229 
While copyright holders need a way to protect their works from in-
fringement, using mass file sharing lawsuits as a remedy threatens to 
deny defendants fair treatment and an opportunity to defend them-
223 See Steven Masur, Collective Rights Licensing for Internet Downloads and 
Streams: Would it Properly Compensate Rights Holders?, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 39, 40 (2011) (advocating collective rights licensing at the ISP level to curb tide 
of illegal file sharing and similar forms of piracy, and also providing compensation 
for copyright holders). See Colin E. Shanahan, ACTA Fool or: How Rights Holders 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 512 's Subpoena Provisions, 15 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 465, 477 (2011) (discussing the negotiation of the ACTA treaty and the 
proposal to expand DMCA section 512(h) subpoena to cover P2P file- sharing users 
engaged in P2P file sharing). 
224 See 200,000 BitTorrent Users Sued in the United States, ToRRENTFREAK 
(Aug. 8, 2011 ), http://torrentfreak.com/200000-bittorrent-users-sued-in-the-united-
states-1l0808/ (reporting that over 200,000 BitTorrent John Does have been sued 
since 2010). 
225 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. 
226 For a further discussion of the significance of courts' resolution of procedural 
issues in file sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text. 
227 See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011 WL 
1807438, at *10 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011). 
228 See Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C. 
2011) (limiting plaintiffs discovery request to IP addresses the plaintiff has a good 
faith belief will correspond with the defendants located in the District of Columbia). 
229 See The Expendables Makers Dismiss Massive BitTorrent Lawsuit, 
ToRRENTFREAK (Aug. 25, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-expendables-makers-
dismiss-massive-bittorrent-lawsuit-l l 0825/ (revealing that Nu Image dropped its suit 
against all defendants upon court's refusal to grant jurisdictional discovery). 
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selves. 230 The overarching concern is that the expense of litigation and 
potential for extremely high awards of damages serve as strong incentive 
for named defendants to accept settlement letters, irrespective of their 
guilt or innocence. 231 In one of the only file sharing cases to proceed to 
litigation, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, a $1,920,000 verdict 
rendered against a defendant who shared twenty-four copyrighted songs 
using a P2P network, subsequently remitted to $54,000. 232 
Given the incentive to settle, once defendants' identifying infor-
mation is released to the copyright holders, the settlement letters are 
served and defendants overwhelmingly choose to accept the offers. 233 
Allowing discovery of defendants' identifying information and deferring 
issues of joinder and personal jurisdiction deprives defendants of an op-
portunity to dispute these matters.234 Findingjoinder of defendants im-
proper helps to prevent copyright holders' goals of mass settlements and 
accords with previous P2P file sharing cases. 235 
230 See Julianne Pepitone, 50,000 BitTorrent Users Sued for Alleged Illegal 
Downloads, CNN MONEY (June 10, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011 /06/1 O/technology/bittorrent_lawsuits/index.htm (collect-
ing views of critics who say Voltage's suit is exploitative of copyright law, and refer-
ring to litigation as employing "pay up or we'll getcha" method). 
231 See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (indicating that file-sharers' lawsuits 
typically proceed no further than the release of the defendants' identifying infor-
mation and subsequent distribution of settlement letters); s.ee supra notes 9-12 and 
accompanying text. 
232 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (remitting damages rendered 
against P2P file-sharer to $2250 per infringed work, three times the statutory mini-
mum). 
233 See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (2008) (indicating that file sharers 
lawsuits typically proceed no further than release of defendants' identifying infor-
mation and subsequent distribution of settlement letters). 
234 See id. (asserting that courts may never resolve procedural questions since 
defendants were unlikely to proceed to trial). 
235 See supra Part N.C for a discussion of why joinder should be found im-
proper. 
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IS WIKILEAKS A HIT MAN 
HANDBOOK?: 
WHY WIKILEAKS CANNOT CLAIM 
FIRST AMENDMENT IMMUNITY IF 
THE AFGHAN AND IRAQ WAR LOGS 
CAUSE PHYSICAL HARM 
Rachel Wolbers* 
"President Obama supports responsible, accountable and open 
government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dan-
gerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and clas-
sified documents, WikiLeaks has put at risk not only the cause of hu-
man rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. "1 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 25, 2010 WikiLeaks.org ("WikiLeaks") released ab:_n~st 
70 000 classified U.S. military documents on to its website, detailing ~erican operations in Afghanistan (the "Afghan War. Logs").2 
While the Afghan War Logs comprised only a small port10n of the 
documents released on WikiLeaks during 2010, this leak alone con-
tained the names and addresses of over 117 informants. 3 A hypothet-
ical cable from the Afghan War Logs would read: 
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